ISIS Threat to South Asia made large by Pakistan, US peace efforts

ISIS has been defeated militarily in Syria and has been driven into hiding in Iraq.

The terror organization took the limelight from Al-Qaeda after taking over Mosul in 2014, establishing a Caliphate over one third of Iraq and one half of Syria at its height. It split with Al-Qaeda in 2013 for being too brutal and for not confining operations to Iraq but spilling over into Syria against Al-Qaeda factions there.

Since then, Russian peace efforts in Syria and the US war on ISIS in Iraq have driven ISIS out of Syria and into hiding in Iraq. But the organization is resilient, better funded than Al-Qaeda and a more appealing alternative for millennials in waging jihad.

While the long-term ISIS risk to the Arabian Gulf and to Iraq cannot be overstated, the organization has been looking short-term to other areas in which to expand its influence. In Yemen it has been largely unsuccessful. In Libya and the Egyptian Sinai peninsula, it has managed to garner enough support to grow as an insurgency.

But Afghanistan is where ISIS is, alarmingly, set to grow beyond an insurgency. President Trump's strategy on winning the Afghan war is the best yet seen from an American president, but as the Taliban are relentlessly hunted and their finances targeted, the Taliban is more likely to splinter: one part will return to Ashraf Ghani's government, the other part will look elsewhere for support and funding - namely, ISIS.

Many ISIS fighters have relocated to Afghanistan. According to Russian sources, the number is as high as 10,000, one third of the US estimates of ISIS numbers at its height in Iraq and Syria:

https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-afghanistan-islamic-state/4176497.html

The reason there are so many more ISIS fighters going into Afghanistan than to Libya, Egypt or Yemen is Pakistan. Like Turkey into Syria, Pakistan has a long history of sending Islamist militants over their border into Afghanistan, to destabilize the region and keep India at bay.

With the Taliban on the back foot and the US putting Pakistan on notice, Pakistan is not only continuing to send militants into Afghanistan - it is escalating its campaign by allowing ISIS fighters into Afghanistan.

These policies from Pakistan and the Trump Administration risk a short-term ISIS takeover of several regions in Afghanistan. While this would certainly decimate Al-Qaeda in its homeland, it risks sending South Asia into a new, deadlier conflict: one which has a real chance of backfiring on Pakistan.

Should ISIS militants gain territory in Afghanistan and should more political pressure be put on Pakistan by the Trump Administration, Islamist insurgency in Pakistan would very likely increase. ISIS are more violent than their Al-Qaeda counterparts, and this may tip Pakistan over the edge where Al-Qaeda and the Taliban could not.

Yet for Afghanistan, the ISIS presence is less likely to lead to a terrorist takeover and more likely to be temporary. It is Pakistan rather than Afghanistan that is at risk of long-term instability caused by ISIS, especially as Pakistan is showing no signs of relenting in its dangerous foreign policy.

Yemen: the next Islamic State UPDATE 2018

Previously published here:

http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com.au/2017/02/yemen-next-islamic-state-2017-update_28.html

Since the 21st of April 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against Zaidi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in an attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power.  In the subsequent chaos of the Yemen War, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both President Hadi and the Zaidi Houthi rebels.

And it is not ISIS.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining most out of the chaos of Saudi Arabia's Yemen war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War (2003) and built up in the Syrian Civil War (2011), AQAP is building its momentum as a direct result of Saudi intervention. And like ISIS, AQAP is underestimated by the group utilizing them.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, though dangerous, is perceived by Saudi Arabia as the 'lesser of two evils' against the Houthis and thus receives aid to fight the Zaidi rebels. AQAP has since emerged as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.

It is unlikely that AQAP would attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes working with the group have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an alliance with Iraqi Ba’ath Party militants disenfranchised with America’s vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS’ aim in establishing a caliphate.

The tribes which back AQAP are largely tribes from Southern Yemen, a previously independent state known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. These tribes seek independence from (and the crippling of) the government based in Northern Yemen.

The UAE is already preparing for such independence to be achieved. With Yemeni President Hadi showing no signs of popularity on the ground, UAE is shifting its support to Aidarous Az-Zubaidi, a figurehead of the Southern Movement.

As with Sisi in Egypt and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, a regime change in Southern Yemen would mean that the tribes in Southern Yemen would become anti-Islamist, autocratic, and would force AQAP into the north exclusively.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been the most effective fighting force against the Houthis. Whether Az-Zubaidi or Hadi rule from Southern Yemen, AQAP will continue gaining strongholds in Northern Yemen at the expense of the Houthis. This will likely weaken Northern Yemen sufficiently enough for the south to achieve its independence or dominance.

However, the threat posed by an AQAP-dominated northern Yemen is not to be underestimated. It threatens not only Southern Yemen and Saudi Arabia; it threatens to damage relations between the Saudi-led coalition and President Trump, who has no love for Al-Qaeda, ISIS or any Salafi terrorists.

But what President Trump does not realize is that there are few forces in the region capable of defeating the Houthis. Like in Iraq and Syria, moderate forces are highly unlikely to win this war: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or the Houthis are far stronger contenders.

Ali Abdullah Saleh dies, Yemeni conflict exacerbates

Forces allied with Ali Abdullah Saleh have recently broken out in fights with the Zaidi Houthi rebels. Ali Abdullah Saleh betrayed the Houthis and sought to mend ties with the Saudi coalition, to stop them from continuing to bomb Yemen and to bring peace to the troubled country.

But in recent hours Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed by the Houthis as he attempted to flee for Saudi Arabia.

This has been the most significant political change in the Yemeni conflict since its inception. With the splitting of the Houthi-Saleh alliance and with the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the powers that have held Sana'a for the past two and a half years have been torn apart.

As with the death of previous dictators, this will result in further fragmentation and conflict. However, unlike with the overthrow of previous Arab dictators, this fragmentation will have a post-mortem focus: ousting the Houthis from Sana'a.

Powers ranging from the Southern Movement, to Hadi, to Al-Qaeda, to Ali Abdullah Saleh's forces - all will be aimed unequivocally at ousting the Houthis from their strongholds in northern Yemen. Unfortunately, even with help from Saleh's forces, the Houthis are fearsome adversaries: the fighting will be bloody and drawn out.

There are many angles to consider for the next stage of the conflict. One is that the Southern Movement is still aiming for secession from the north, and with Saleh's forces and the Houthis fighting each other, there will be less forces able to resist the inevitable rendering of the south from the north. Ali Abdullah Saleh was the dictator who united the south to the north. With Saleh dead, there will be less incentive than ever for the south to stay with the north.

The other is that, apart from Saleh's forces, Al-Qaeda remains the most effective fighting force against the Houthis in Yemen. With Ali Abdullah Saleh dead, some of his forces will join the coalition and some will join Al-Qaeda. It is highly unlikely that any of Saleh's forces will mend their ties with the Houthis, nor will any ally with the Southern Movement. However, depending on when the south secedes from the north will depend on to what extent Saleh's forces ally with the coalition and to what extent they ally with Al-Qaeda.

Since 2015, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been using the conflict to expand its influence. With violence escalating as a result of the Saleh-Houthi divorce, Al-Qaeda will only get stronger. This is another reason why the south may secede from the north in the short-term rather than the long-term: the secessionists are being encouraged by the UAE to drive Al-Qaeda out of the south - the only other area where they would be tolerated is into the north exclusively against the Houthis.

In the north of Yemen, the conflict is about to get even worse. Northern Yemen is on the brink of famine, and the coalition is undoubtedly losing patience. The kind of vacuum created by Ali Abdullah Saleh's death in Northern Yemen is exactly the kind of vacuum in which terrorism thrives, and monsters like ISIS grow.

Yemen: Southern Movement used to reduce Al-Qaeda Threat

With backing from the UAE, the Southern Movement has been catapulted into Yemen politics' center stage.

While Saudi Arabia has been involved in an air campaign against the Houthis, to restore Saudi ally Hadi to power over all of Yemen, in the south of the country UAE has been politically allying with the Southern Movement. This is because Saudi Arabia's ally Hadi is as unpopular in the south as in the north, and for the UAE to make sure that neither Al-Qaeda nor the Houthis end up in control of Southern Yemen, bolstering efforts for the south to secede from the north is advantageous.

Before their unification in 1990, Yemen was two independent states: the more populous, mountainous north and the sparsely populated south. Due to the current Yemen war, aspirations for south secession have grown and, with UAE-backing, seem likely.

This would undoubtedly have consequences for the region. This would all at once increase governance in Southern Yemen and reduce Al-Qaeda's presence there. Under northern leadership, needs in the south have been largely ignored, meaning Al-Qaeda has long maintained its base in Southern Yemen through soft power tactics such as fixing basic services and building infrastructure. With priorities in Southern Yemen likely to be met by new leadership, Al-Qaeda will be forced to move elsewhere.

Dangerously, the only area left for Al-Qaeda to go is in Northern Yemen, against the Houthis. Should Saudi Arabia decide to continue the war against the Houthis, Al-Qaeda will end up the main foot soldiers against them, meaning that, even should Hadi regain control of Sana'a, most of his foot soldiers would be members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

There is a chance that a ceasefire will be implemented in Yemen, with the Houthis controlling the north and the Southerners controlling the south. But the Houthis are allied with Ali Abdullah Saleh, who in 1990 was the President who instigated the unification of Yemen. The Houthis, Al-Qaeda and the Southern Movement all stand to gain from continuing the conflict in the north, so Saudi Arabia may have no choice but to continue.

Should the south secede from the north, the new southern state may be encouraged to support Hadi in regaining control of Sana'a and establishing new borders between the two states. The south would be likely to support continued military efforts against the north, because as long as the north is weak, the south has the best chance of remaining a separate state.

However, Al-Qaeda stands to gain enormously. Should the south be complicit in sending their homegrown Al-Qaeda militants to fight the Houthis, this will only be advantageous in the short run. The northerners indoctrinated by Al-Qaeda, after the ousting of the Houthis and Hadi, will want revenge against the south. Southern separation from Yemen is a band aid on a fatal wound in the Arabian Peninsula.

After Egypt, Syria, will Ikhwan push for Libya?

The Ikhwan are the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, it has pushed for control of several countries: in 2012, the Ikhwan gained control of Egypt; in addition, throughout the Syrian Civil War, the Ikhwan monopolized on the violence to spread its message.

However both Egypt and Syria have ended in significant failure for the Ikhwan. In 2013 in Egypt, the Ikhwan Morsi government was overthrown. Since 2015, the rebels have been losing the Syrian civil war, and Turkey and Qatar, the two main backers of the Ikhwan worldview, have been brought to the negotiating table with Iran and Russia.

Since then, Saudi Arabia has targeted Qatar for support to Iran, the Ikhwan and Salafi groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. This has alienated Qatar from the GCC and has forced Iran and Turkey to intervene on the small Gulf nation's behalf.

While it is possible that the Ikhwan and Iranian political worlds will converge on Saudi Arabia, a more immediate proxy war is being waged in Libya: between the strongman government in the east of the country - backed by Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. - and the mainly Ikhwan government in the west - backed by Qatar, Turkey and the European Union.

A Libyan living in Switzerland, Basit Igtet, is organizing protests against both governments in Libya for the 25th of September 2017. Basit Igtet was an active member of the Libyan revolution in 2011 against Qaddafi. However, unlike other protests, Ikhwan influence has drastically decreased in both Syria and Egypt, meaning that wealthy Ikhwan support is more likely to be funded in Libya which, with the rise of Haftar Al-Khalifa, could very easily escalate into a new level of violence.

Since the Arab Spring, one of the problems with a decrease in violence and instability in one country is a corresponding increase in another. It may just be that, in the next few months, it will be Libya's turn to churn instability and chaos previously unimaginable under the former regime of Moammar Al-Qaddafi. Out of such instability and chaos, yet another terrorist organization may be formed.

After Syria, terrorism increase in Libya likely

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438605/hillary-clinton-benghazi-scandal-arming-syrian-rebels

According to Wikileaks, when Libyan President Moammar Al-Qaddafi was overthrown, his weapons were looted and taken to Syria. The insurgency in Libya died down, and most jihadists went to fight Bashar Al-Assad in Syria.

The results of such decisions by the US State Department are shocking. Syrian rebels overwhelmingly pledged allegiance to ISIS, invaded western and northern Iraq and declared a Caliphate.

Now, after 3 years of US intervention and after 2 years of Russian intervention in Syria, ISIS is almost defeated in Iraq and almost destroyed in Syria. ISIS will still remain a potent threat to Iraq, but in Syria, so long as Bashar Al-Assad remains in power, ISIS is highly unlikely to return.

Now the tables are turned. The only area of dominance for anti-Assad rebels are in Idlib, where Al-Qaeda has managed a complete takeover of the Syrian Opposition. With an Al-Qaeda takeover certain in Idlib, the Trump Administration has given Russia permission to destroy them unhindered.

But after Idlib, it would be foolish to expect that violence will correspondingly decrease across the Middle-East. In 2013, Mohammed Morsi was overthrown, and while stability returned to Egypt for a time, instability increased in Syria, Iraq and Libya in 2014. With Syria set to be cleared of jihadists and Iraq set for a lull in the fighting, conflicts in Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan will all intensify.

But Libya is the last bastion of the US-intervened Arab Spring. Jihadists, though failing in Syria, might instead return to Libya to make sure Islamism rules somewhere in the Arab world.

What happens in Idlib may determine what happens in Libya. Should Turkey close its borders to Idlib in the ensuing conflict between Al-Qaeda and the Syrian government, then Libya would have less to fear. However, should Turkey allow jihadists to flee Syria only to regroup in Libya, then the people of Libya will suffer enormously, and a new terror organisation could rear its ugly head in Libya.

Turkey could send Syrian Al-Qaeda militants to Libya to shore up the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan forces there. Having lost Ikhwan dominance in Syria and Egypt, Libya is one of the last bastions of instability through which Ikhwan could take over, benefiting Turkish influence in the Arab world.

Added to the conundrum is the current crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia supports the Tobruk government in the east, while Turkey and Qatar both support the Government of National Accord in Libya and the largely Ikhwan militants which back it. For Qatar, Libya might be a way to get back at Saudi Arabia for alienating it from the GCC.

Like Iraq in 2014, escalated violence in Libya may come as a complete shock to the western world. But it will likely be another example of fallout from President Obama's Arab Spring policies, which have failed spectacularly and caused more damage to the Arab world than even the Iraq War.

US leaflets undermine Afghan War

Though well known for patriotism, the US continue to have an abysmal handling of foreign policy in the Middle-East.

Days ago, leaflets were dispatched in Parwan Province, north of Kabul, in which a lion was devouring a dog. Unfortunately, the Taliban's logo, "There is no god but God and Mohammed is God's Messenger" was embedded on the dog, while the US was portrayed as the lion.

The reason this causes such a problem is that this slogan of the Taliban is also the shahaada, the proclamation a person says to become a Muslim. It is in Arabic, considered by Afghans the language of God. But a dog is considered spiritually unclean and defiled. Combining a dog with the perceived words of God is definitely ill advised.

Far more beneficial would have been to design a pamphlet with Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundaza riding a dog into battle, while the US and Afghans riding lions to defeat him. The Afghans would have laughed and got the message.

Either these leaflets were distributed by accident, or it was an act of sabotage from within the military and/or Trump Administration. President Trump wants to win the Afghan war, but not everyone within the Administration and military would benefit from a victory in Afghanistan. Some US politicians are bought out by China, a benefactor from a US defeat in Afghanistan, so their priorities lie elsewhere.

This is a blow to decisive victory in Afghanistan. Whether President Trump is able to deal with this foreign policy blunder effectively will determine the outcome of the war during his Presidency.

Haftar Al-Khalifa and Israel

Haftar Al-Khalifa, the strong man winning the Libyan civil war, is cultivating stronger ties with Israel, according to the following article:

http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/haftar-israeli-military-aid-strongman-reveals-new-friend-libya-1638239413

This represents a pattern which continues to occur post-Arab Spring: Sunni Arab countries are looking to Israel for their national security. With the increase of Iranian dominance, this increase is noticeable between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and with the fall of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, Sisi has also cultivated strong ties with Israel.

It also exposes the false narrative of an implicit alliance between Israel and Salafi/Ikwani terrorism. While this is certainly conclusive in Syria, this does not hold true in every Arab conflict. In the cases of Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE, terrorists hinder Israeli influence, not help. Israel prefers strongmen wary of terrorism and Iran, but would rather Salafi or Ikhwani terrorists to Iranian allied states.

As for Libya, this is good news: Haftar sending signals to Israel means the US will be less inclined to condemn Khalifa and Russia for stabilizing the country and create less hostility.

Afghanistan Strategy to wait until after ISIS?

It might be that the reason the Trump Administration is taking so long on a strategy for winning the Afghan war is because they wish to see ISIS defeated first.

Bush and Obama both began their presidencies more interested in Afghanistan, yet ended up more invested in Iraq; for Bush it was invading Iraq 18 months after Afghanistan and for Obama, it was returning to Iraq to defeat ISIS in 2014. Trump may just be doing the opposite: beginning his presidency more interested in Iraq and ending up more invested in Afghanistan.

Certainly the long Afghan policy review is welcome news for many, as it is always better to have a plan thoroughly reviewed and scrutinized before being implemented. But it might also be because the President's priorities are elsewhere in foreign policy: first with ISIS but also with North Korea.

The end of the war on ISIS is in sight. Raqqa is surrounded by the Syrian Kurds. The Syrian Arab Army is decimating ISIS across the desert of eastern Syria. Mosul has been retaken by the Iraqi Army. Tel Afar, Hawija and western Anbar are ISIS' last strongholds in Iraq. Abadi and Trump have agreed to keeping a residual US force in Iraq after the defeat of ISIS. Trump has stated the US is not going into Syria to remove Bashar Al-Assad.

Though Trump has said that after ISIS is defeated, he would spend more time invested in rebuilding America, in Afghanistan glints a desire to outshine Obama: Obama withdrew from Iraq in 2011, to return 3 years later to a country decimated by ISIS. Can Trump win a Bush-era war where Obama could not? He campaigned hard against the Obama doctrine, and is making all the right moves to push the US to victory in Afghanistan.

But it may just be that we will not see a coherent policy on Afghanistan until ISIS is defeated.

Why Trump will not leave Afghanistan

There has been talk in the White House about leaving Afghanistan altogether. But Trump will not leave Afghanistan.

This ploy by Trump - suggesting to leave Afghanistan - is to get his cabinet to think seriously about how to win the war there. Threatening to pull out puts their toes to the fire and forces them to come up with a different solution.

Some progress has been made in Afghan War policy. Trump has escalated strikes on the Taliban and the Islamic State of Afghanistan; policy reviews have included criticism of Pakistan's double game, making sure Afghanistan does not become another client state of Iran or Russia and, crucially, given the United States an economic reason to stay in Afghanistan: minerals, which the Taliban make part of their living off.

What should be undeniable - but currently is not - is that the Taliban can be beaten so long as their economic supply is strangled and border control between Afghanistan and Pakistan is strengthened. Most of the money the Taliban makes is from narcotics, secondly from minerals - if both of these fell into the hands of the government, this would make the difference needed to push tribes away from supporting the Taliban and back to the government.

In fact, narcotics in the hands of the Afghan and US forces could go some way to destabilizing Iran if they were sold to Iranians on the black market.

Trump will not leave Afghanistan because to leave would be to do exactly what Obama did with Iraq in 2011, something Trump campaigned against. Winning a Bush-era war where Obama could not would be icing on the cake for Trump's Presidency.

In any case, the US staying in Afghanistan is good for the Middle-East. It keeps the US military industrial complex churning, allows Russia more influence in countries like Syria, Libya and, in the future, Yemen, and deprives Iran, Al-Qaeda and ISIS a safe haven in another country.

But, as Trump well knows, the Afghan war must be won, or else Afghanistan will become the US' next Vietnam. And Trump will do everything he can to make sure that doesn't happen, for veterans and for America First.

Why Pakistan is an enemy of the US

The Pakistani government has been an enemy of the United States.

Nuclear armed, the Pakistani government gives regular funding and sanctuary to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants. Osama Bin Laden himself was found in Pakistan.

Pakistan is the reason why the Afghan War has dragged on for so long. Terrified of an independent Afghanistan, Pakistan has been continually funding the Taliban, because so long as Afghanistan is a weak nation, Pakistan is strong and India can be held at bay.

Indian dominance terrifies Pakistan more than anything else. But the US is getting tired of Pakistan playing a double-game and, under Trump, expect US-Indian-Afghani relations to improve.

So long as the Pakistan problem is not dealt with, the Afghan war will never end. The only way to end the Afghan War is to step up Afghani-Pakistani border control between to prevent any members of the Taliban from getting into or out of either country.

Immense pressure needs to be applied on Pakistan to force it to sever ties with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.

Russia, for example, already showed how to do this with Turkey: in Syria, Russian air power dominated the Turkish-backed rebels and forced them to retreat on almost every front. Turkey then shot down a Russian jet and in response Russia escalated its campaign against the rebels and severed all ties with Turkey. Turkey then repaired ties with both Russia and the Assad Government when it realised its previous foreign policy had completely failed and it was at risk at losing even more outright with the Kurds on its border.

Pakistan needs America much more than America needs Pakistan. Should America move to annihilate the Taliban, increase Afghani-Pakistani border security and increase US-Indian-Afghani ties, Pakistan will come to the negotiating table and even sever ties with the Taliban. But it will only do so if the US shows military might and crushes Pakistani proxies completely.

This is why it seems Trump's regional approach to Afghanistan may succeed where Obama's and Bush's did not. Trump may win the Afghan war by forcing Pakistan to stop acting as an enemy of the US.

Trump reaffirms support to Afghanistan

For more information, see the link below:

http://www.khaama.com/trump-speaks-with-president-ghani-after-deadly-kabul-explosion-02839



In the wake of the ISIS terror attack on Kabul which left 80 people dead, Trump has rung Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and reaffirmed US support of the government and the commitment to ending terrorism there.

Trump ran an historic Presidential campaign, in which his slogan was often "America First." There are those who are wondering how getting tangled back in the Afghan quagmire benefits the US and whether Trump should just withdraw from the country altogether.

I say no. I would be glad for Trump to stay in Afghanistan, the reason being that military resources tied up in both Afghanistan and Iraq are less spared for other military temptations, such as in Syria, Iran, Yemen, Libya or North Korea. Trump starting new wars while withdrawing from old ones, as Obama did, would be a very dark and foolish idea.

Better would be for Trump to pass up on newer military opportunities (such as temptations in Syria, Iran, Yemen, Libya or North Korea) in favour of winning the old ones. One of the things Trump spoke of on the campaign trail was "winning" and "winning big." It would, therefore, stick with Trump's campaign rhetoric if he stayed in Afghanistan to win the war by rapidly changing the conditions upon which said war is played on.

The Trump Administration has been all too willing to do that. In the last 6 months, the Afghan question has been carefully studied and pondered in the hope of finding a way to win the war there. While rapidly defeating ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Trump has taken his time regarding Afghanistan to make sure nothing rash is done there.

Not only has there been careful and deliberate thinking about the Afghan question - Pakistan has been sharply slapped on the wrist for supporting the Taliban. They have lost hundreds of millions of dollars in funding from the US - more recently, in his historic counter-terrorism speech in Saudi Arabia, Trump did not even mention Pakistan as a partner. The Trump Administration has been clearly sending signals to Pakistan that, should they remain in implicit support of the Taliban, they would lose the US as a close ally.

This reaffirmation of support for the Afghan government does not suggest a neo-con change in Trump - rather, it represents an entirely different policy to Obama: seeking to win old wars, not start new ones.

Macron signals openness to Haftar Al-Khalifa

Macron's French Administration has signaled that Haftar Al-Khalifa and the Libyan National Army are part of the solution:

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-libya-idUSKCN18E2UU

With all the sabre-rattling going on over Ukraine and Syria between Russia and Europe, it is interesting that some European countries are willing to work with Russian goals for stability, such as in Libya. This willingness would likely benefit Europe enormously, as a stable Libya means less economic migrants from North Africa.

This shows that, in many ways, Emmanuel Macron parallels Obama, in being unwilling to play the Establishment handbook at every step of the way. Macron willing to cede power to Russia in Libya is reminiscent of Obama refusing to overthrow Bashar Al-Assad in Syria.

This is terrific news for Libya. The Libyan National Army and Haftar Al-Khalifa are certainly stabilizing forces in the Arab country, and France is finally willing to embrace pragmatism to see Arab countries like Libya reach stability.

No planned NATO surge in Afghanistan

In his meeting with NATO partners in Brussels, Trump did not call for a surge of NATO troops in Afghanistan.

Trump did scold allies for not spending their 2% of the nations' budgets on defense and, as a result, did not enunciate support for article 5, which states that the US would come to the aid of any NATO ally attacked. Both NATO allies and Trump stayed quiet on Russia, and only reached agreement on disapproval for Russian action in Ukraine. This likely means that Trump still does not support the ousting of Bashar Al-Assad, though other members of his Administration wish it were so.

They did however reach consensus on NATO putting its resources into the fight against the Islamic State, which suggests Trump's priority is still the utter destruction of ISIS over and above defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Trump's Afghanistan policy is taking longer and longer to get finalized, with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson saying it would likely take a couple more weeks. This is good news, as a fleshed-out Afghanistan policy is more likely to bring the war to a necessary conclusion.

However, dangerous parallels are emerging between the Afghan War and the Vietnam War. Unless Trump does something to bring the war to its conclusion, the Afghan War may be lost as shamefully as the Vietnam War was.

Russia and Yemen

I have bad news for Saudi Arabia: Russia is interested in Yemen.

Russia is propagating the awful carnage going on in Yemen, and doing so from a pro-Houthi stance. As America is withdrawing from the Middle-East and being sick of being involved in an endless cycle of wars, Russia seeks to fill the void in strategic countries.

Syria has been Russia's most obvious target, with Russia shoring up Bashar Al-Assad's forces. Russia now has a complete monopoly on Syria, ranging from military bases to even business investments in the country.

Less well known has been the Russian-Egyptian alliance in Libya in support of Haftar Al-Khalifa. They are supporting Al-Khalifa to make him the next Arab strongman and to deny terrorists a safe haven there.

In its telling of the news, Russia has shown support for the Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh and want to make sure that Yemen does not fall into the same chaos as Iraq did. Limited by Iraq and Afghanistan, should Russia move to act decisively in Yemen, America will be forced to watch from the sidelines. For America, Yemen - and even Saudi Arabia - is just not worth it.

But Russia is unlikely to act in Yemen for now. More likely is that Russia will play the long game and only intervene after Syria and Libya are stabilized and after Saudi options for Yemen are exhausted.

Such a defeat by Russia for the Saudis would be utterly humiliating, and crush Saudi dreams that Mohammed Bin Salman is anything other than the most foolish leader to have ever ruled the kingdom. Should Russia stabilize Syria, Libya and Yemen and should America stay out of Yemen, Saudi relations with other countries will be irrevocably severed, and instability will creep ever closer to the Arabian Gulf.

Trump's support for Saudi War on Yemen

How much does the Trump Administration support the Saudi War on Yemen?

The Trump Administration says Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is priority number 1, but clearly a Houthi-controlled Yemen (which would be the fastest way to crush AQAP) is also antithetical to Saudi interest, and therefore antithetical to "American interest."

It looks as if Jim Mattis, Trump's Secretary of Defense, has been given the lead regarding Saudi-American relations and Yemen. He maintains that the Houthis are Iran-backed. He also maintains that military pressure on the Houthis could bring them to the negotiating table.

However, their thinking is flawed for a few reasons. First, Al-Qaeda will always exist in Yemen without a strong government, and the only government strong enough to defeat Al-Qaeda is the government controlled by Saleh and the Houthis. Second, Iran only gave weapons to the Houthis after Saudi Arabia started bombing them, so Saudi has brought this dilemma largely on themselves.

Third, it is very unlikely the Saudi campaign will bring the Houthis to the negotiating table - more likely is that Saudi Arabia will be forced to prolong the Yemen conflict to the bankruptcy of their own country, leading Saudi Arabia into the instability its neighbours share.

Trump's support of the Saudi war on Yemen is limited to shared intelligence and assisting Saudi in their airstrikes. However, the Administration is clearly giving more help to Saudi Arabia than Obama did, which is worrying.

Ultimately, it looks as if terrorism will shrink in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan due to Trump policy, but will increase in Yemen and, subsequently, in Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will likely become a monster as large as ISIS was in 2014 and will likely enter Saudi Arabia from the south. Should Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula arrive on Saudi's southern doorstep, it will trigger a wider war in Saudi Arabia. ISIS will come back to life, but instead of in Syria and Iraq, in Saudi's northern, eastern and central regions.

Trump's not perfect. And, so far, Trump's willingness to let Saudi do what it wants in Yemen is more disappointing than anything he has done - except strike Assad's airport in Syria.

NATO surge in Afghanistan next month?

According to the following article, Trump's Afghan policy will likely be finalized next month, at the about same time as he will hold a NATO meeting:

https://www.khaama.com/trump-administrations-afghan-policy-likely-to-be-finalized-next-month-khalilzad-02625

This bodes very interesting for Afghanistan. Rather than dragging more US troops into Afghanistan, Trump may decide instead for more NATO troops to shoulder the burden of Afghanistan to even the load between US and non-US NATO troops, which was mostly carried by the US in Afghanistan during the war.

This would fit with Trump's campaign promise, to make NATO more relevant: more focused on terrorism than Russia.

It would also help for NATO to be fully implemented in Afghanistan because Russia is flexing its muscles in Syria. To make the West still seem strong, strength is needed to be exerted somewhere else - Afghanistan provides a fitting target.

Though Afghanistan is important to America, Trump's immediate priorities are ISIS in Iraq and Syria, assessing the Yemen debacle, Iran and North Korea. For this reason there has been considerable delay in seeing Trump's policy in Afghanistan.

But as I have said before, a strong Afghanistan threatens Iran. And using NATO to make Afghanistan into a "block" would help Trump push back Iranian influence in the Middle-East, as well as remove a terror stronghold which has plagued the region for nearly 40 years.

What is going on in Libya?

For the Obama Administration, Libya "succeeded" where Syria failed.

In 2011, Obama ordered a "no-fly-zone" in Libya to knock out the Gidaffi's Libyan Government. They succeeded. Unfortunately, most of the government services lynched on Gidaffi's regime, which meant a complete collapse of Libya followed.

By 2014, two governments ended up vying for competition. The first - the legitimate government - uprooted itself and is to this day located in Tobruk. They are the remnants of Gidaffi's regime, backed by the Libyan National Army.

The second government - based in Tripoli - was largely militias allied to the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda. That was their power on the ground.

In 2016, Obama and the European powers tried to create a compromise government between the two groups. This was never going to work, because the Tobruk government wants no Islamism, and the Tripoli government does.

So a new government was formed in Tripoli; the Government of National Accord. This government has even less power than the previous Tripoli government did, and is largely beholden to the same tribes and factions that the Muslim Brotherhood/Al-Qaeda linked government was.

All that has really changed is the legitimate government of Libya was swapped from Tobruk to Tripoli. However, that has not stopped the Tobruk Government from getting stronger.

In recent months, the Tobruk-based government - spear-headed by Haftar Al-Khalifa, a strong man eyeing for complete control of Libya - has gained large swathes of Libyan territory from the Government of National Accord, both in the oil crescent in the north and also in the desert regions of the south.

The Tobruk government has backing of many of the top regional powers - such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia - while the Tripoli government has backing of Qatar, Turkey and Europe - mainly supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Tobruk Government is also allied with Russia. With America refusing to get involved in Libya -for which we must be incredibly thankful - Russia and Egypt are likely to see victory in Libya at the hands of Haftar Al-Khalifa and the Tobruk government, with a peaceful and stable Libya to follow.

What is going on in Yemen?

Yemen is a sovereign country being bombed by its richer neighbour.

There are three main areas of Yemen which need to be understood to understand the Yemeni conflict. First is Southern Yemen, stretching across all of Eastern Yemen and the southern port cities of Aden and Mukalla. The second and third main areas are located in Northern Yemen, divided in 2, one populated with mainly Sunnis and the other populated with mainly Zaidis.

Zaidiya is an ancient form of Islam that is neither Shi'ite nor Sunni, but halfway between each. For over a thousand years the Zaidi tribes ruled northern Yemen - both the Sunni and Zaidi parts of northern Yemen - and were only very recently thrown off from power - in the 1960's. They since reemerged in their full power in 2014 under the guise of the Houthis.

After the Arab Spring, the dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh was thrown off and his Vice President, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi was made the new President of Yemen. Ali Abdullah Saleh is a Zaidi Muslim from the north - Hadi is a Sunni Muslim from the South.

However with the downfall of the Saleh government, Yemen was ruled by more chaos than ever before. Worryingly, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (القاعدة في جزيرة العرب) had grown alarmingly strong, particularly in Southern Yemen. To solve the crisis, Ali Abdullah Saleh ordered the tribes still loyal to him, both Sunni and Zaidi, to ally with the Houthis. The Saleh-Houthi alliance meant Zaidi Muslims were back on top. They took control of Sana'a and forced Hadi to leave the capital.

But the Houthis wanted to capture Hadi. They wanted a fall-guy to pin the political debacle on and Hadi was it. So they invaded Southern Yemen.

Enter Saudi Arabia.

Hadi subsequently sought refuge in Saudi Arabia and, under then new king, King Salman, a coalition was brought together to target the Houthi-Saleh alliance with a bombing campaign, seeking to bring an end to the Zaidi dominance in Yemen and restore control to Hadi.

Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia's error is very costly and alarming. This war has largely benefitted Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which would have been completely driven out of Yemen had the Houthis controlled Southern Yemen as well as Northern Yemen. If Saudi Arabia succeeds in dislodging the Houthis from their power, the northern tribes - both Sunni and Zaidi - would sooner ally with Al-Qaeda than ally with Hadi. Then Yemen, on the side of Al-Qaeda, would be fighting Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

Of course the war would spread to Saudi Arabia.

That is nothing to say of the awful famine occurring in Yemen. Children are sticks. Five year olds look like toddlers. Toddlers look like infants. Infants look non-human. The barbarity and cruelty of the Yemen War is horrifying.

It is not a civil war. It is a war forced on the Yemenis to benefit Saudi standing in the region. The only reward Yemen can bring Saudi Arabia is a full-fledged Al-Qaeda insurgency on their southern doorstep. And that is the best case scenario.

Why Afghanistan is so important to Trump

Of all the Middle-East countries the US is militarily engaged in, Afghanistan is second in importance only to Iraq.

After Iraq, Afghanistan is the most geo-strategic country for American foreign policy. That is the reason America has been in the country so long.

Yet unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is out of the public eye. Trump is focused on defeating ISIS in Syria and Iraq - and he is right to be doing so. However, Afghanistan is incredibly important to Trump for reasons other than simply ISIS:

1) Trump wants to end a Bush war.

There would be nothing quite so sweet for Trump as to succeed in Afghanistan where Obama failed in Iraq. If Trump actually won the Afghan War, he would go down in history as one of the great Presidents - and certainly as a greater President than Barrack Obama.

2) A Strong Afghanistan weakens Iran.

After dealing with the ISIS threat in Iraq and Syria, Trump's next Middle-East task will be quashing Iranian influence. His putting Iran "on notice" has stopped the theocracy from testing ballistic missiles. Beyond that, Trump's goal is to get Iraq out of Iranian influence - an enormous task. He may also try - diplomatically - to get rid of Bashar Al-Assad and replace him with a pro-Russian, anti-Iranian dictator - which will most certainly fail.

But Afghanistan! A strong Afghanistan puts more pressure on Iran to watch their eastern borders as they used to watch their western borders with Saddam Hussein. Trump will have to cede to nation-building in Afghanistan to create a "block" (in his words) against Iran.

3) Russia would like to take Afghanistan back.

Worryingly, Russia has been eyeing influence in Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban. After 16 years of bloodshed, Trump is unlikely to see Afghanistan fall into the hands of Russia.

It is more likely that Trump will allow Russian influence to continue unabated in Syria and Libya - as is currently occurring in Libya and to a lesser extent in Syria - than withdraw American support for Afghanistan. It makes no sense for Trump to give up Afghanistan when he could let Russia use their effort and resources in retaking Syria and Libya, which are less costly for America to lose.

4) Trade is Trump's forte.

Afghani President Ashraf Ghani has tempted Trump with an investment opportunity for America in Afghanistan. See the following article for reference:

http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/trump-afghanistan-mineral-reserves-235962

The minerals in Afghanistan are worth an enormous amount of money. Trump will not let an investment like this fall flat on its face - not with so much else to lose by not intervening in Afghanistan.



Trump is more likely to engage militarily in Afghanistan than in Syria post-ISIS, Yemen against the Houthis or in Libya. It is just simply too strategic for the US - and, more specifically, Trump - to give up on it.

Introduction

For information on Syria, see here:

http://jwaversyria.blogspot.com.au/

For information on Iraq, see here:

http://iraqwarjwaver.blogspot.com.au/


Dear all,

This blog will mainly focus on the forgotten conflicts of the Middle-East - namely Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan. These conflicts do not receive the kind of media attention that they deserve.

For example, Yemen is in a brutal conflict in which a coalition of the richest Arab countries is oppressing the poorest; namely, Yemen. Yemen is practically in famine and it seems there is no end to the crisis.

As another example, Libya has been a lawless state for the past 6 years, since Hillary Clinton's "we came, we saw, he died." Currently Egypt and Russia are making progress in stabilizing Libya while Europe is floundering around, waiting for America to enter a conflict they will not enter.

As for Afghanistan, it is the war we hear has been going on for 16 years with no end in sight. Contrary to what you would think, Afghans don't mind the American presence - on the condition that the Americans can actually defeat the Taliban - which, under Trump, I think they will.

I will be posting more on this blog. Enjoy!