Al-Qaeda and a stalemate in Yemen

It is no secret that the devastating Yemen war is a stalemate.

The Houthis still control the majority of Northern Yemen, the more populous half of the country. The recent threat of operations against Hodeidah, the Houthis' largest port in Yemen, is a strategy by the Saudi-led coalition to give it an edge over the Houthis.

But to break the stalemate, the coalition is trying more than just the threat of operations in Hodeidah. Increasing intelligence reports show that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the largest terrorist organization in the region, has been covertly enlisted against the Houthis in Northern Yemen, even while the UAE leads military offensives against the same organization in the south of the country.

As highlighted in a previous article [see http://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2017/12/yemen-next-islamic-state-update-2018.html] the aim of the tribes in Southern Yemen is to use Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [or AQAP] to weaken Northern Yemen to such an extent that Southern Yemen will be able to become an independent nation. This requires AQAP to be driven out of the south while also being encouraged to relocate to the north, receiving funding, arms and guaranteed protection from counter-terrorism agencies.

As Al-Qaeda was driven out of Saudi Arabia exclusively into Yemen in 2006, so the coalition hopes to see Al-Qaeda driven out of Southern Yemen exclusively into the north, keeping two enemies of Saudi Arabia - the Houthis and AQAP - at each other's throats.

This would lead Southern Yemen to a status of superiority over Northern Yemen, similar to Pakistan over Afghanistan or Turkey over Syria. This would force Northern Yemen into endless internal conflicts between AQAP, the Houthis and the government, while Southern Yemen continues to consolidate a position of strength with help from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

This may even lead Southern Yemen to be allowed to join the Gulf Cooperation Council, leaving Northern Yemen reeling from poverty, terrorism, chaos and more war. Should the Saudi-led coalition's strategy prove successful, Southern Yemen's future looks as bright as Northern Yemen's future looks bleak.

Should AQAP be driven out of Southern Yemen exclusively into the north, Saudi Arabia would have little to fear from the organization as it would be preoccupied in Northern Yemen and turn to destabilize Southern Yemen before Saudi Arabia. But the success of this strategy depends on how permanently AQAP is driven from Southern Yemen, as well as a successful secession of the south, which is still by no means a certain prospect.

UAE overreach in Tunisia to have grave consequences for Libya

For those hoping the end of the Libyan civil war was in sight, previous developments in Tunisia are particularly worrying.

Several months ago Libyan strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa secured Derna, the most conservative city in the country's east. This city, previously taken by ISIS before being driven out by other Islamist militias, served as a severe handicap on the Libyan National Army's ability to drive into either the west or south of the country. Now that the city is secure, Haftar can attack west or south as he chooses.

But in Tunisia in June, the UAE sponsored an attempted military coup. The UAE has long been a supporter of autocracy in the region, supporting Abdul Feteh As-Sisi's rise to power in Egypt, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman's rise in Saudi Arabia, the Southern Movement in Yemen, the attempted military coup in Turkey and, of course, Libyan strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa.

The attempted coup in Tunisia will very likely have a drastic impact on how the North African neighbour views developments in Libya in favour of Haftar Al-Khalifa. In short, UAE's funding of an attempted military coup in Tunisia backfired in a classic case of strategic overreach.

This is likely to have grave consequences for Libya. Tunisia views the militias in power in Tripoli and western Libya as a bulwark against UAE-backed autocracy and will be less cautious about Islamist ambitions in the region, spearheaded by Turkey, Qatar and Sudan.

Because of this, it is unlikely that Haftar Al-Khalifa will try and wrest control of western Libya in the short-term. The next target for the Libyan National Army will likely be the country's lawless south.

But even military operations in the south pose problems. Smuggling from western Libya - and, by extension, Tunisia - could give covert support to terrorist groups like ISIS which would keep Haftar distracted in a long, bloody battle for southern Libya at the expense of the west.

Worse still, Sudan, an important partner in the Qatari-Turkish axis, borders Libya in the south. Should Tunisia more actively side with the Turkey, Qatar and Sudan in the Libyan proxy war, as seems likely, terrorism could spike in Libya as it has done in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. For Tunisia, the calculation is likely to be that terrorism is an easier threat to manage than the threat of regime change from their military.

While global attention remains on Iraqi elections, the Syrian civil war and the devastation in Yemen, Libya may unexpectedly heat up and destabilize. This may turn southern and western Libya into terrorist hubs as deadly as Afghanistan before 9-11.