ISIS Threat to South Asia made large by Pakistan, US peace efforts

ISIS has been defeated militarily in Syria and has been driven into hiding in Iraq.

The terror organization took the limelight from Al-Qaeda after taking over Mosul in 2014, establishing a Caliphate over one third of Iraq and one half of Syria at its height. It split with Al-Qaeda in 2013 for being too brutal and for not confining operations to Iraq but spilling over into Syria against Al-Qaeda factions there.

Since then, Russian peace efforts in Syria and the US war on ISIS in Iraq have driven ISIS out of Syria and into hiding in Iraq. But the organization is resilient, better funded than Al-Qaeda and a more appealing alternative for millennials in waging jihad.

While the long-term ISIS risk to the Arabian Gulf and to Iraq cannot be overstated, the organization has been looking short-term to other areas in which to expand its influence. In Yemen it has been largely unsuccessful. In Libya and the Egyptian Sinai peninsula, it has managed to garner enough support to grow as an insurgency.

But Afghanistan is where ISIS is, alarmingly, set to grow beyond an insurgency. President Trump's strategy on winning the Afghan war is the best yet seen from an American president, but as the Taliban are relentlessly hunted and their finances targeted, the Taliban is more likely to splinter: one part will return to Ashraf Ghani's government, the other part will look elsewhere for support and funding - namely, ISIS.

Many ISIS fighters have relocated to Afghanistan. According to Russian sources, the number is as high as 10,000, one third of the US estimates of ISIS numbers at its height in Iraq and Syria:

https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-afghanistan-islamic-state/4176497.html

The reason there are so many more ISIS fighters going into Afghanistan than to Libya, Egypt or Yemen is Pakistan. Like Turkey into Syria, Pakistan has a long history of sending Islamist militants over their border into Afghanistan, to destabilize the region and keep India at bay.

With the Taliban on the back foot and the US putting Pakistan on notice, Pakistan is not only continuing to send militants into Afghanistan - it is escalating its campaign by allowing ISIS fighters into Afghanistan.

These policies from Pakistan and the Trump Administration risk a short-term ISIS takeover of several regions in Afghanistan. While this would certainly decimate Al-Qaeda in its homeland, it risks sending South Asia into a new, deadlier conflict: one which has a real chance of backfiring on Pakistan.

Should ISIS militants gain territory in Afghanistan and should more political pressure be put on Pakistan by the Trump Administration, Islamist insurgency in Pakistan would very likely increase. ISIS are more violent than their Al-Qaeda counterparts, and this may tip Pakistan over the edge where Al-Qaeda and the Taliban could not.

Yet for Afghanistan, the ISIS presence is less likely to lead to a terrorist takeover and more likely to be temporary. It is Pakistan rather than Afghanistan that is at risk of long-term instability caused by ISIS, especially as Pakistan is showing no signs of relenting in its dangerous foreign policy.

Yemen: the next Islamic State UPDATE 2018

Previously published here:

http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com.au/2017/02/yemen-next-islamic-state-2017-update_28.html

Since the 21st of April 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against Zaidi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in an attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power.  In the subsequent chaos of the Yemen War, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both President Hadi and the Zaidi Houthi rebels.

And it is not ISIS.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining most out of the chaos of Saudi Arabia's Yemen war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War (2003) and built up in the Syrian Civil War (2011), AQAP is building its momentum as a direct result of Saudi intervention. And like ISIS, AQAP is underestimated by the group utilizing them.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, though dangerous, is perceived by Saudi Arabia as the 'lesser of two evils' against the Houthis and thus receives aid to fight the Zaidi rebels. AQAP has since emerged as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.

It is unlikely that AQAP would attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes working with the group have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an alliance with Iraqi Ba’ath Party militants disenfranchised with America’s vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS’ aim in establishing a caliphate.

The tribes which back AQAP are largely tribes from Southern Yemen, a previously independent state known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. These tribes seek independence from (and the crippling of) the government based in Northern Yemen.

The UAE is already preparing for such independence to be achieved. With Yemeni President Hadi showing no signs of popularity on the ground, UAE is shifting its support to Aidarous Az-Zubaidi, a figurehead of the Southern Movement.

As with Sisi in Egypt and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, a regime change in Southern Yemen would mean that the tribes in Southern Yemen would become anti-Islamist, autocratic, and would force AQAP into the north exclusively.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been the most effective fighting force against the Houthis. Whether Az-Zubaidi or Hadi rule from Southern Yemen, AQAP will continue gaining strongholds in Northern Yemen at the expense of the Houthis. This will likely weaken Northern Yemen sufficiently enough for the south to achieve its independence or dominance.

However, the threat posed by an AQAP-dominated northern Yemen is not to be underestimated. It threatens not only Southern Yemen and Saudi Arabia; it threatens to damage relations between the Saudi-led coalition and President Trump, who has no love for Al-Qaeda, ISIS or any Salafi terrorists.

But what President Trump does not realize is that there are few forces in the region capable of defeating the Houthis. Like in Iraq and Syria, moderate forces are highly unlikely to win this war: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or the Houthis are far stronger contenders.

Ali Abdullah Saleh dies, Yemeni conflict exacerbates

Forces allied with Ali Abdullah Saleh have recently broken out in fights with the Zaidi Houthi rebels. Ali Abdullah Saleh betrayed the Houthis and sought to mend ties with the Saudi coalition, to stop them from continuing to bomb Yemen and to bring peace to the troubled country.

But in recent hours Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed by the Houthis as he attempted to flee for Saudi Arabia.

This has been the most significant political change in the Yemeni conflict since its inception. With the splitting of the Houthi-Saleh alliance and with the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the powers that have held Sana'a for the past two and a half years have been torn apart.

As with the death of previous dictators, this will result in further fragmentation and conflict. However, unlike with the overthrow of previous Arab dictators, this fragmentation will have a post-mortem focus: ousting the Houthis from Sana'a.

Powers ranging from the Southern Movement, to Hadi, to Al-Qaeda, to Ali Abdullah Saleh's forces - all will be aimed unequivocally at ousting the Houthis from their strongholds in northern Yemen. Unfortunately, even with help from Saleh's forces, the Houthis are fearsome adversaries: the fighting will be bloody and drawn out.

There are many angles to consider for the next stage of the conflict. One is that the Southern Movement is still aiming for secession from the north, and with Saleh's forces and the Houthis fighting each other, there will be less forces able to resist the inevitable rendering of the south from the north. Ali Abdullah Saleh was the dictator who united the south to the north. With Saleh dead, there will be less incentive than ever for the south to stay with the north.

The other is that, apart from Saleh's forces, Al-Qaeda remains the most effective fighting force against the Houthis in Yemen. With Ali Abdullah Saleh dead, some of his forces will join the coalition and some will join Al-Qaeda. It is highly unlikely that any of Saleh's forces will mend their ties with the Houthis, nor will any ally with the Southern Movement. However, depending on when the south secedes from the north will depend on to what extent Saleh's forces ally with the coalition and to what extent they ally with Al-Qaeda.

Since 2015, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been using the conflict to expand its influence. With violence escalating as a result of the Saleh-Houthi divorce, Al-Qaeda will only get stronger. This is another reason why the south may secede from the north in the short-term rather than the long-term: the secessionists are being encouraged by the UAE to drive Al-Qaeda out of the south - the only other area where they would be tolerated is into the north exclusively against the Houthis.

In the north of Yemen, the conflict is about to get even worse. Northern Yemen is on the brink of famine, and the coalition is undoubtedly losing patience. The kind of vacuum created by Ali Abdullah Saleh's death in Northern Yemen is exactly the kind of vacuum in which terrorism thrives, and monsters like ISIS grow.