The Empire of the United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates, one small nation in the Gulf Cooperation Council, is now the dominant political force of the Arab world.

The UAE is the primary backer for autocracy in the Middle-East. Its funding and influence was first noted in 2013, when the Egyptian military overthrew the Ikhwan government of Mohammed Morsi. Since then the UAE has additionally backed the Kurds in Syria, Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya and the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen. The UAE is also responsible for the rise of Mohammed Bin Salman, now Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia.

However, there are signs that the UAE's empire has reached its limit. In December 2015 Libya's Government of National Accord was formed and, earlier this year, Turkey militarily intervened to save the GNA from UAE-backed Haftar Al-Khalifa. Since 2016 in Syria, the Russians have permitted Turkish intervention against the Kurds in exchange for consolidation of the Syrian Government over rebel-held areas.

But the UAE's most ambitious project is its support for the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen. After militarily intervening with Saudi Arabia in support of Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the UAE has diverged from previous policy by using the STC as its proxy in Southern Yemen. This has caused a war within a war: while President Hadi's forces wage war with the Houthis in the north, the STC is waging war with President Hadi's forces in the south.

The outcome most favourable to the UAE in Yemen can be summed up in two consolidations: first, the military, political and economic consolidation of the STC over all of Southern Yemen; second, the consolidation of President Hadi's forces and government solely into Northern Yemen. Then President Hadi would become a pawn of the STC: President Hadi's forces and government would be used to militarily occupy the Houthis' attention in the north, while the STC consolidates its own position politically and economically in the south.

However, it is Turkey which represents the greatest threat to UAE-backed autocracy. Eventually, in Syria, Turkey will be forced to cede control of Idlib and its occupied zone northeast of Idlib - in return, Russia will acquiesce to Turkey's full political control over Libya and a further Turkish invasion of the US-Kurdish zone in northeast Syria. Decimating the Kurds in Syria and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya might be enough to guarantee the end of both wars - but it would mean the UAE would lose two of its valuable proxies.

Time, now, is the crucial factor in determining whether or not Yemen will be added to Turkey's list of conquests. Should the Syrian and Libyan conflicts be resolved before the UAE irons out its position in Yemen, Yemen would become a springboard from which the United Arab Emirates would be threatened as never before. But, given the US still has its presence in Syria, the UAE might be able to salvage its position in Yemen before Turkey and Russia reach their expected compromise.

In Libya and Yemen, Turkey is on the march

Turkey is strengthening its geostrategic position before being forced to make compromises.

In the last few months, Turkey has defended its position in Syria's Idlib from Russia, Iranian and Syrian incursion, sent crucial supply and aid to Libya's Government of National Accord and, via Turkish charities, has consolidated its position in Yemen, which is embroiled in conflict.

Turkey is no fan of the Trump Administration's policies in the Middle-East. Traditional balance between the autocratic and Islamist halves of the Middle-East has been rejected. Instead, the Trump Administration has thrown its weight behind the autocratic half of the Sunni Middle-East, supporting policies conducive for Israel, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates in particular. This has resulted in the rise of Mohammed Bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, support for the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds and acquiescence given to Liban strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa and separatists in Yemen's south.

But against the odds, Turkey is still pursuing its agenda in Syria, Libya and Yemen. Over the tenure of the Trump Administration, Turkey has successfully scaled back US support for the Syrian Kurds and made inroads on autocratic spheres of influence in Libya and Yemen. For those who support autocratic rule in the Middle-East, most worryingly of all is the increasing economic and military ties between Turkey and Russia. Tied together with the coming Cold War between the United States and China, the Turkish and Russian-Iranian spheres of influence in the Middle-East are likely to reach a compromise favourable to China and unfavourable to the United States.

This will likely mean Syria will be resolved in an outcome favourable to Russia and Iran and less favourable to Turkey. Eventually, rebel-held Idlib will have to fall to the Syrian government. In exchange, Turkey will likely occupy the last US-held areas in Syria and be allowed by Russia to liquidate the Syrian Kurds.

Should the fall of Idlib occur, Turkey is likely to have an even larger Syrian refugee problem than it has already. Because of this, Iran, Russia and China are likely to ease the economic fallout. Russia already has significant economic ties with Turkey and has successfully delivered its S-400 missile system there. Though Turkey will likely incur US sanctions for using the S-400 missile system and will also likely be expelled from NATO, China and Iran will step in economically and help ease the pressure of US sanctions. Then Turkey would likely be given the green light for eroding autocratic influence in both Libya and Yemen.

For Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, this is a nightmare scenario. If Turkey falls into the Sino-Russian sphere of influence, allows the Syrian civil war to end and also dominates the Sunni Arab governments of Libya and Yemen, the potential for conflict to be ignited in Saudi Arabia and Iraq is compounded. Conflict between Iran and the United States in Iraq would loom large, and Mohammed Bin Salman would be outmaneuvered in Yemen by its Turkish competitor. Egypt would have a Muslim Brotherhood government to contend with to its west and an unstable Saudi Arabia to its east.

Of all players in Yemen, Turkey has the best chance for negotiating peace between the Iran-backed Houthis and President Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi. But should President Hadi turn its back on Saudi Arabia in favour of Turkey, Saudi Arabia will be threatened as never before from its Yemeni border, from Iran and from Qatar. The risk to Saudi Arabia for conflict is greater even than the risk in Iraq.

The timing of US sanctions on Turkey will determine when exactly this nightmare scenario will occur. For Syria, Libya and Yemen, this will likely mean an end to the fighting. For the United States, it will be forced to keep its attention on the Middle-East for many decades to come.

Libya's place in Cold War 2

Libya is an essential cog in the coming Cold War between China and the United States.

Recently, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan sent arms and Syrian militias to support the Government of National Accord in Libya. By doing so, President Erdogan saved the Libyan government from General Haftar Al-Khalifa's forces, which were marching on the capital Tripoli. Such a move was long ago predicted in this blog:

https://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2018/01/after-failures-in-egypt-syria-erdogan.html

In response, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates and France formed an international anti-Turkey alliance in the Mediterranean. Such a move was obviously condemned by Turkey, and it shows Turkish influenced being challenged as never before by western powers.

Prior to Turkish moves in Libya, in Syria, Russian, Syrian and Iranian forces marched on rebel-held Idlib. As a result, several Turkish soldiers in Idlib's Observation Posts were killed: in retaliation, Turkey unleashed a barrage of fire on approaching Iranian and Syrian targets, only to be stopped by a cease-fire deal reached between President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

So far, President Putin has been unable to completely reconcile Turkey to its vision for Syria and, until he achieves this, will be unable to secure victory in Syria. But all President Putin has to do is wait. Turkey is insuring that, eventually, it will have to give in to Russian interests in Syria - even if at a price not entirely palatable to Russia.

The Russian strategy has always been to try and get Turkey on side in Syria. Frustratingly for the international anti-Turkey alliance, Libya is likely to part of a deal between Russia and Turkey. That Russia and Syria are not part of the international anti-Turkish alliance is curious, given President Putin and Bashar Al-Assad have both backed General Haftar against Turkish interest there, and points to a mutual understanding between Russia and Turkey of their ultimate geostrategy in the Mediterranean.

More ominously for western powers, China is likely to weigh in on Middle-Eastern affairs as never before. As Cold War 2 begins between China and the United States, wresting Turkey from the American sphere of influence would greatly change the geostrategy of the entire region in favour of China and Russia. China putting its weight behind Turkey would mean China would also support Turkish moves to dominate all of Libya.

In exchange, Turkey would be able to turn on the S-400 Russian missile defense system, which is compatible with Russian and Chinese military hardware; as the United States sanctions Turkey for such a move, Turkey would receive substantial financial assistance from China. Turkey would then have to give up control of Syria's Idlib and be allowed to defeat the remnants of the PKK in Syria, forcing the United States out of Syria altogether and giving Russia, Iran and Syria their much-needed victory in Idlib.

Such a grand bargain would reverberate throughout the region for many decades to come. In response to such moves, the United States would likely throw its weight behind the international anti-Turkey alliance, and the western bloc of the Middle-East would be formed against the Chinese-led block: China, Russia, Turkey, Libya, Syria and Iran.

Should China, Russia and Turkey iron out their differences in the region, not only would they be able to outmaneuver their western opponents in Syria and Libya: they would be able to prepare for the next round of proxy wars. After a complete US withdrawal from Syria under Sino, Russian, Turkish and domestic pressure, a war between the United States and Iran for control of Iraq becomes more likely. Additionally, to keep Egyptian interest away from a Turkey-dominated Libya, instability could be fomented instead in Saudi Arabia. With Iran and Turkey supporting various rebel forces in Syria and Libya, such forces could be transferred to Saudi Arabia for the ultimate prize.

Should US President Donald Trump continue on his current course in the Middle-East and against China, this is the likely scenario. Ignoring Libya, staying in Syrian oilfields long after the defeat of ISIS and not meeting Turkish strategic interest is likely to cause a cataclysmic challenge to the Trump doctrine on the Middle-East, and is more likely to see victory in favour of Russia and China.

Al-Qaeda and a stalemate in Yemen

It is no secret that the devastating Yemen war is a stalemate.

The Houthis still control the majority of Northern Yemen, the more populous half of the country. The recent threat of operations against Hodeidah, the Houthis' largest port in Yemen, is a strategy by the Saudi-led coalition to give it an edge over the Houthis.

But to break the stalemate, the coalition is trying more than just the threat of operations in Hodeidah. Increasing intelligence reports show that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the largest terrorist organization in the region, has been covertly enlisted against the Houthis in Northern Yemen, even while the UAE leads military offensives against the same organization in the south of the country.

As highlighted in a previous article [see http://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2017/12/yemen-next-islamic-state-update-2018.html] the aim of the tribes in Southern Yemen is to use Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [or AQAP] to weaken Northern Yemen to such an extent that Southern Yemen will be able to become an independent nation. This requires AQAP to be driven out of the south while also being encouraged to relocate to the north, receiving funding, arms and guaranteed protection from counter-terrorism agencies.

As Al-Qaeda was driven out of Saudi Arabia exclusively into Yemen in 2006, so the coalition hopes to see Al-Qaeda driven out of Southern Yemen exclusively into the north, keeping two enemies of Saudi Arabia - the Houthis and AQAP - at each other's throats.

This would lead Southern Yemen to a status of superiority over Northern Yemen, similar to Pakistan over Afghanistan or Turkey over Syria. This would force Northern Yemen into endless internal conflicts between AQAP, the Houthis and the government, while Southern Yemen continues to consolidate a position of strength with help from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

This may even lead Southern Yemen to be allowed to join the Gulf Cooperation Council, leaving Northern Yemen reeling from poverty, terrorism, chaos and more war. Should the Saudi-led coalition's strategy prove successful, Southern Yemen's future looks as bright as Northern Yemen's future looks bleak.

Should AQAP be driven out of Southern Yemen exclusively into the north, Saudi Arabia would have little to fear from the organization as it would be preoccupied in Northern Yemen and turn to destabilize Southern Yemen before Saudi Arabia. But the success of this strategy depends on how permanently AQAP is driven from Southern Yemen, as well as a successful secession of the south, which is still by no means a certain prospect.

UAE overreach in Tunisia to have grave consequences for Libya

For those hoping the end of the Libyan civil war was in sight, previous developments in Tunisia are particularly worrying.

Several months ago Libyan strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa secured Derna, the most conservative city in the country's east. This city, previously taken by ISIS before being driven out by other Islamist militias, served as a severe handicap on the Libyan National Army's ability to drive into either the west or south of the country. Now that the city is secure, Haftar can attack west or south as he chooses.

But in Tunisia in June, the UAE sponsored an attempted military coup. The UAE has long been a supporter of autocracy in the region, supporting Abdul Feteh As-Sisi's rise to power in Egypt, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman's rise in Saudi Arabia, the Southern Movement in Yemen, the attempted military coup in Turkey and, of course, Libyan strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa.

The attempted coup in Tunisia will very likely have a drastic impact on how the North African neighbour views developments in Libya in favour of Haftar Al-Khalifa. In short, UAE's funding of an attempted military coup in Tunisia backfired in a classic case of strategic overreach.

This is likely to have grave consequences for Libya. Tunisia views the militias in power in Tripoli and western Libya as a bulwark against UAE-backed autocracy and will be less cautious about Islamist ambitions in the region, spearheaded by Turkey, Qatar and Sudan.

Because of this, it is unlikely that Haftar Al-Khalifa will try and wrest control of western Libya in the short-term. The next target for the Libyan National Army will likely be the country's lawless south.

But even military operations in the south pose problems. Smuggling from western Libya - and, by extension, Tunisia - could give covert support to terrorist groups like ISIS which would keep Haftar distracted in a long, bloody battle for southern Libya at the expense of the west.

Worse still, Sudan, an important partner in the Qatari-Turkish axis, borders Libya in the south. Should Tunisia more actively side with the Turkey, Qatar and Sudan in the Libyan proxy war, as seems likely, terrorism could spike in Libya as it has done in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. For Tunisia, the calculation is likely to be that terrorism is an easier threat to manage than the threat of regime change from their military.

While global attention remains on Iraqi elections, the Syrian civil war and the devastation in Yemen, Libya may unexpectedly heat up and destabilize. This may turn southern and western Libya into terrorist hubs as deadly as Afghanistan before 9-11.

Forgotten Middle-East Update - Qatar

Qatar is the way through which instability is likely to rear its ugly head in the Arabian Gulf.

Due to the embargo imposed by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, Qatar's own economy is under threat. While short-term things are unlikely to change in the small Arabian nation, mid-term to long-term the embargo is likely to negatively impact not only Qatar but the surrounding Arabian Gulf region.

The result of such an embargo has been that Qatar has strengthened relations with both Iran and Turkey, both of which are adversities to the four countries involved in the embargo. Through Qatar's current predicament, Iran and Turkey have been brought closer to the Arabian Gulf than ever before.

As the geopolitics of the Middle-East continue to realign, relations will continue to deteriorate in the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the council itself is likely to be disbanded and recreated under a different name - with Qatar excluded. Such a move is likely to benefit Iraq, which may end up swapping places with Qatar and, for Iraq, instead of being the pro-Iranian outcast, may be brought into a new Gulf Council. Qatar would then be the new pro-Iranian outcast, bringing more open hostility from its neighbours than ever.

Before such hostilities are brought to bear in the Arabian Gulf itself, they are likely to be settled in a preliminary proxy war in Libya. (Such a dress rehearsal is reminiscent of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930's, which was the prelude to the longer, bloodier conflict between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1940's.) As the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have been winding down, countries like Libya are becoming increasingly unstable. This conflict has pitted autocrats against Islamists - which is the classic UAE/Saudi-versus-Qatar rivalry. As violence continues to recede elsewhere, such hostilities are likely to escalate severely in Libya.

The conflict in Libya would either end in a victory for the autocrats - led by Haftar Al-Khalifa - or a less-likely victory for the Islamists. The only way the Islamists would win in Libya would be if another nation got involved, such as Turkey, either through a direct military confrontation or through the funneling of supplies and foreign fighters from its own land - which was used in Syria - into Libya.

After the Libyan civil war is concluded, either way, instability will arrive at the Arabian Gulf. Should Turkey continue to militarily back Qatar and make sure that the Ikhwan philosophy survives in the Middle-East, eventually the Arabs will no longer tolerate Turkish meddling in Qatar, and a war would ensue between previously American allies - namely, Turkey and Saudi Arabia - which would tear the Arabian Gulf to pieces.

Saudi Arabia's Mohammed Bin Salman is facing increasing pressure in his proxy wars in Yemen, Qatar and Iraq (the latter two being economic proxy wars instead of military). Should insufficient progress be made on any of these fronts, the Saudi Crown Prince would have to make a game-changing decision: either more directly fund Al-Qaeda in Yemen to win the war against the Houthis, or militarily occupy Qatar and force regime change. Though former is more likely, Mohammed Bin Salman's own impulsive foreign policy would be wise not to underestimate.

Forgotten Middle-East Update - Yemen and Libya

In Syria, Bashar Al-Assad is consolidating control, while Iranian influence is being rolled back from the Syrian-Israeli border and Trump wants to withdraw - meanwhile in Iraq, anti-American Shi'ite cleric Muqtada As-Sadr has won the largest number of seats in the election and is set to make a coalition government with Haider Al-Abadi's party.

As the known conflicts in Iraq and Syria continue to deescalate, other conflicts are escalating.

The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is poised to start an offensive to take port Hodeida from Houthi control, a move which would cripple northern Yemen's already dwindling food supplies. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda continues to thwart the US-anti-terrorist strategy in the country's southeast, while in the north the terror group is flourishing in the absence of effective government. Yemeni President Hadi is only nominally in control of Yemen, while Houthis, Al-Qaeda, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the Southern Movement control different parts of the country.

In Libya, though the As-Sirraj government and the Libyan National Army headed by Haftar Al-Khalifa have agreed to hold elections, the situation in Libya is exacerbating. Haftar's forces have surrounded the city of Derna - Derna being a city like Iraq's Fallujah: a city that even in the days of the dictator was hard to control.

Meanwhile, the situation in Libya's Tripolitania is made tense by the growing rift between the Sirraj government and the militias in control of various parts of the region. It may be that the coming elections will force any legitimate government out of Tripolitania altogether and propel the militias into effective control, much as the Syrian Opposition has tried to do in Syria's Idlib. But, like Syria's opposition forces, the Libyan Shura councils and militias have links to groups as extreme as Al-Qaeda and ISIS - and, with the Syrian conflict winding down, many Islamists will continue to see Libya as the ultimate destination for establishing Shariah and waging jihad.

If such regional explosion in north-western Libya were not troubling enough, the conflict in the country's south is threatening to create space in which ISIS may rise in Libya for a third time. After being defeated in the cities Derna and Sirte, ISIS has fled to the south of the country and largely fallen silent. But the resentment of African Libyans in the south against their Arab counterparts in the north may be exactly the sort of thing ISIS needs to make a comeback in the country.

Though this in itself may be troubling, more troubling still is that the tribes in southern Libya are linked to other tribes across the region, such as in northern Chad, northeastern Niger and northwestern Sudan. Should ISIS succeed in winning the protection of tribes in the south of Libya, this protection would spread and ignite a regional explosion - one which would mean that ISIS would once again be breaking borders, this time between Libya, Chad and Niger, with assistance from terror groups Boko Haram and Ash-Shabab.

As Iraq and Syria continue to recover from years and years of war, Libya and Yemen continue to worsen. The instability in the region is not gone - it has only shifted.

Erdogan eyes Libya after failures in Egypt, Syria

For Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan represents a revival of the Ottoman Empire and a rejection of the Ataturk secular state. As a result, Ikhwan ideology has been spreading across the Middle-East at a more rapid rate, with the Arab Spring initially providing perfect fuel for Erdogan's ambitions.

However, in Egypt and Syria in particular, Turkish support for the Ikhwan has backfired badly.

Though Egyptian Ikhwan leader Mohammed Morsi was elected in 2012, a year later he was overthrown in a military coup, a coup aided by the largest protests in history. Ikhwan had completely lost the support of the Egyptian people, and President Erdogan suffered a serious setback in his ambition to recreate the Ottoman Empire.

Though Libya looked promising for the Ikhwan and Turkey after the overthrow of Moammar Al-Qaddafi in 2011, military strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa broke ranks with the Islamist factions in Tripoli and set up a rival government in Tobruk in 2014. Since then, Haftar has regained much territory in Libya, with north-western Libya as the exception.

Syria was where the Turkish-Ikhwan policy was pushed hardest with the least results. Qatari-Turkish funding gave weapons to rebel groups so extreme they had more in common with ISIS than even the most extreme elements of Al-Qaeda. It is not hard to see, then, that these groups never had much support from the Syrian people.

With the regional shift caused by the impending peace process in Syria, President Erdogan is likely to lose much influence in Syria as well. Currently the Syrian Arab Army, Russia, Iran and Hezbollah are forcing many of the Syrian rebels out of other regions and into Idlib, which has caused an enormous receding of violence in the region.

However, what President Erdogan has lost in Syria and Egypt he has a chance to regain in Libya. Recently in Tunisia he boasted that he was planning a political settlement in Libya, while also refusing to accept Bashar Al-Assad as the legitimate ruler in Syria. To Russia, President Erdogan is sending a clear message: Assad only stays in Syria if Turkey receives enough compensation.

Such compensation for Turkey would include the dismantling of Kurdish militias in north-eastern Syria, and may even include the relocation of rebel fighters and armaments from Syrian Idlib province to Libya via Turkey.

The reason why such rebel fighters and armaments may be relocated to Libya is because Turkey has acted as a transit for jihad between Syria and Libya before. At the conclusion of the Libyan uprising against Moammar al-Qaddafi, many of the weapons used in Libya were relocated to Syria, to put more pressure on the Assad government:

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/440822/hillary-clinton-scandals-libya-prosecutions-undermined

Worryingly for Turkey, many of the fighters for the Syrian Opposition are foreigners. Should Turkey lose Idlib to President Assad in the peace settlement, those foreigners may turn their weapons on Turkey without another option.

Libyan strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa is exactly the sort of figure against which foreign fighters from Syria would desire to wage jihad. With relations improving between Turkey and the Libyan Government of National Accord - the UN-recognized Libyan government with ties to the Ikhwan - the war in Libya may be escalated by a concluded political settlement in Syria: one where Russia allows President Assad full control of Syria, while Turkey is allowed more influence in Libya.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has shown resilience in the face of setbacks to his original plans for control of the Middle-East. This resilience shows that Turkey under its present leadership cannot be trusted to act as a stabilizing force, and all its actions should be scrutinized as a means for further chaos in the region.

ISIS Threat to South Asia made large by Pakistan, US peace efforts

ISIS has been defeated militarily in Syria and has been driven into hiding in Iraq.

The terror organization took the limelight from Al-Qaeda after taking over Mosul in 2014, establishing a Caliphate over one third of Iraq and one half of Syria at its height. It split with Al-Qaeda in 2013 for being too brutal and for not confining operations to Iraq but spilling over into Syria against Al-Qaeda factions there.

Since then, Russian peace efforts in Syria and the US war on ISIS in Iraq have driven ISIS out of Syria and into hiding in Iraq. But the organization is resilient, better funded than Al-Qaeda and a more appealing alternative for millennials in waging jihad.

While the long-term ISIS risk to the Arabian Gulf and to Iraq cannot be overstated, the organization has been looking short-term to other areas in which to expand its influence. In Yemen it has been largely unsuccessful. In Libya and the Egyptian Sinai peninsula, it has managed to garner enough support to grow as an insurgency.

But Afghanistan is where ISIS is, alarmingly, set to grow beyond an insurgency. President Trump's strategy on winning the Afghan war is the best yet seen from an American president, but as the Taliban are relentlessly hunted and their finances targeted, the Taliban is more likely to splinter: one part will return to Ashraf Ghani's government, the other part will look elsewhere for support and funding - namely, ISIS.

Many ISIS fighters have relocated to Afghanistan. According to Russian sources, the number is as high as 10,000, one third of the US estimates of ISIS numbers at its height in Iraq and Syria:

https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-afghanistan-islamic-state/4176497.html

The reason there are so many more ISIS fighters going into Afghanistan than to Libya, Egypt or Yemen is Pakistan. Like Turkey into Syria, Pakistan has a long history of sending Islamist militants over their border into Afghanistan, to destabilize the region and keep India at bay.

With the Taliban on the back foot and the US putting Pakistan on notice, Pakistan is not only continuing to send militants into Afghanistan - it is escalating its campaign by allowing ISIS fighters into Afghanistan.

These policies from Pakistan and the Trump Administration risk a short-term ISIS takeover of several regions in Afghanistan. While this would certainly decimate Al-Qaeda in its homeland, it risks sending South Asia into a new, deadlier conflict: one which has a real chance of backfiring on Pakistan.

Should ISIS militants gain territory in Afghanistan and should more political pressure be put on Pakistan by the Trump Administration, Islamist insurgency in Pakistan would very likely increase. ISIS are more violent than their Al-Qaeda counterparts, and this may tip Pakistan over the edge where Al-Qaeda and the Taliban could not.

Yet for Afghanistan, the ISIS presence is less likely to lead to a terrorist takeover and more likely to be temporary. It is Pakistan rather than Afghanistan that is at risk of long-term instability caused by ISIS, especially as Pakistan is showing no signs of relenting in its dangerous foreign policy.

Yemen: the next Islamic State UPDATE 2018

Previously published here:

http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com.au/2017/02/yemen-next-islamic-state-2017-update_28.html

Since the 21st of April 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against Zaidi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in an attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power.  In the subsequent chaos of the Yemen War, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both President Hadi and the Zaidi Houthi rebels.

And it is not ISIS.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining most out of the chaos of Saudi Arabia's Yemen war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War (2003) and built up in the Syrian Civil War (2011), AQAP is building its momentum as a direct result of Saudi intervention. And like ISIS, AQAP is underestimated by the group utilizing them.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, though dangerous, is perceived by Saudi Arabia as the 'lesser of two evils' against the Houthis and thus receives aid to fight the Zaidi rebels. AQAP has since emerged as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.

It is unlikely that AQAP would attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes working with the group have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an alliance with Iraqi Ba’ath Party militants disenfranchised with America’s vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS’ aim in establishing a caliphate.

The tribes which back AQAP are largely tribes from Southern Yemen, a previously independent state known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. These tribes seek independence from (and the crippling of) the government based in Northern Yemen.

The UAE is already preparing for such independence to be achieved. With Yemeni President Hadi showing no signs of popularity on the ground, UAE is shifting its support to Aidarous Az-Zubaidi, a figurehead of the Southern Movement.

As with Sisi in Egypt and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, a regime change in Southern Yemen would mean that the tribes in Southern Yemen would become anti-Islamist, autocratic, and would force AQAP into the north exclusively.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been the most effective fighting force against the Houthis. Whether Az-Zubaidi or Hadi rule from Southern Yemen, AQAP will continue gaining strongholds in Northern Yemen at the expense of the Houthis. This will likely weaken Northern Yemen sufficiently enough for the south to achieve its independence or dominance.

However, the threat posed by an AQAP-dominated northern Yemen is not to be underestimated. It threatens not only Southern Yemen and Saudi Arabia; it threatens to damage relations between the Saudi-led coalition and President Trump, who has no love for Al-Qaeda, ISIS or any Salafi terrorists.

But what President Trump does not realize is that there are few forces in the region capable of defeating the Houthis. Like in Iraq and Syria, moderate forces are highly unlikely to win this war: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or the Houthis are far stronger contenders.

Ali Abdullah Saleh dies, Yemeni conflict exacerbates

Forces allied with Ali Abdullah Saleh have recently broken out in fights with the Zaidi Houthi rebels. Ali Abdullah Saleh betrayed the Houthis and sought to mend ties with the Saudi coalition, to stop them from continuing to bomb Yemen and to bring peace to the troubled country.

But in recent hours Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed by the Houthis as he attempted to flee for Saudi Arabia.

This has been the most significant political change in the Yemeni conflict since its inception. With the splitting of the Houthi-Saleh alliance and with the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the powers that have held Sana'a for the past two and a half years have been torn apart.

As with the death of previous dictators, this will result in further fragmentation and conflict. However, unlike with the overthrow of previous Arab dictators, this fragmentation will have a post-mortem focus: ousting the Houthis from Sana'a.

Powers ranging from the Southern Movement, to Hadi, to Al-Qaeda, to Ali Abdullah Saleh's forces - all will be aimed unequivocally at ousting the Houthis from their strongholds in northern Yemen. Unfortunately, even with help from Saleh's forces, the Houthis are fearsome adversaries: the fighting will be bloody and drawn out.

There are many angles to consider for the next stage of the conflict. One is that the Southern Movement is still aiming for secession from the north, and with Saleh's forces and the Houthis fighting each other, there will be less forces able to resist the inevitable rendering of the south from the north. Ali Abdullah Saleh was the dictator who united the south to the north. With Saleh dead, there will be less incentive than ever for the south to stay with the north.

The other is that, apart from Saleh's forces, Al-Qaeda remains the most effective fighting force against the Houthis in Yemen. With Ali Abdullah Saleh dead, some of his forces will join the coalition and some will join Al-Qaeda. It is highly unlikely that any of Saleh's forces will mend their ties with the Houthis, nor will any ally with the Southern Movement. However, depending on when the south secedes from the north will depend on to what extent Saleh's forces ally with the coalition and to what extent they ally with Al-Qaeda.

Since 2015, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been using the conflict to expand its influence. With violence escalating as a result of the Saleh-Houthi divorce, Al-Qaeda will only get stronger. This is another reason why the south may secede from the north in the short-term rather than the long-term: the secessionists are being encouraged by the UAE to drive Al-Qaeda out of the south - the only other area where they would be tolerated is into the north exclusively against the Houthis.

In the north of Yemen, the conflict is about to get even worse. Northern Yemen is on the brink of famine, and the coalition is undoubtedly losing patience. The kind of vacuum created by Ali Abdullah Saleh's death in Northern Yemen is exactly the kind of vacuum in which terrorism thrives, and monsters like ISIS grow.

Yemen: Southern Movement used to reduce Al-Qaeda Threat

With backing from the UAE, the Southern Movement has been catapulted into Yemen politics' center stage.

While Saudi Arabia has been involved in an air campaign against the Houthis, to restore Saudi ally Hadi to power over all of Yemen, in the south of the country UAE has been politically allying with the Southern Movement. This is because Saudi Arabia's ally Hadi is as unpopular in the south as in the north, and for the UAE to make sure that neither Al-Qaeda nor the Houthis end up in control of Southern Yemen, bolstering efforts for the south to secede from the north is advantageous.

Before their unification in 1990, Yemen was two independent states: the more populous, mountainous north and the sparsely populated south. Due to the current Yemen war, aspirations for south secession have grown and, with UAE-backing, seem likely.

This would undoubtedly have consequences for the region. This would all at once increase governance in Southern Yemen and reduce Al-Qaeda's presence there. Under northern leadership, needs in the south have been largely ignored, meaning Al-Qaeda has long maintained its base in Southern Yemen through soft power tactics such as fixing basic services and building infrastructure. With priorities in Southern Yemen likely to be met by new leadership, Al-Qaeda will be forced to move elsewhere.

Dangerously, the only area left for Al-Qaeda to go is in Northern Yemen, against the Houthis. Should Saudi Arabia decide to continue the war against the Houthis, Al-Qaeda will end up the main foot soldiers against them, meaning that, even should Hadi regain control of Sana'a, most of his foot soldiers would be members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

There is a chance that a ceasefire will be implemented in Yemen, with the Houthis controlling the north and the Southerners controlling the south. But the Houthis are allied with Ali Abdullah Saleh, who in 1990 was the President who instigated the unification of Yemen. The Houthis, Al-Qaeda and the Southern Movement all stand to gain from continuing the conflict in the north, so Saudi Arabia may have no choice but to continue.

Should the south secede from the north, the new southern state may be encouraged to support Hadi in regaining control of Sana'a and establishing new borders between the two states. The south would be likely to support continued military efforts against the north, because as long as the north is weak, the south has the best chance of remaining a separate state.

However, Al-Qaeda stands to gain enormously. Should the south be complicit in sending their homegrown Al-Qaeda militants to fight the Houthis, this will only be advantageous in the short run. The northerners indoctrinated by Al-Qaeda, after the ousting of the Houthis and Hadi, will want revenge against the south. Southern separation from Yemen is a band aid on a fatal wound in the Arabian Peninsula.

After Egypt, Syria, will Ikhwan push for Libya?

The Ikhwan are the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, it has pushed for control of several countries: in 2012, the Ikhwan gained control of Egypt; in addition, throughout the Syrian Civil War, the Ikhwan monopolized on the violence to spread its message.

However both Egypt and Syria have ended in significant failure for the Ikhwan. In 2013 in Egypt, the Ikhwan Morsi government was overthrown. Since 2015, the rebels have been losing the Syrian civil war, and Turkey and Qatar, the two main backers of the Ikhwan worldview, have been brought to the negotiating table with Iran and Russia.

Since then, Saudi Arabia has targeted Qatar for support to Iran, the Ikhwan and Salafi groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. This has alienated Qatar from the GCC and has forced Iran and Turkey to intervene on the small Gulf nation's behalf.

While it is possible that the Ikhwan and Iranian political worlds will converge on Saudi Arabia, a more immediate proxy war is being waged in Libya: between the strongman government in the east of the country - backed by Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. - and the mainly Ikhwan government in the west - backed by Qatar, Turkey and the European Union.

A Libyan living in Switzerland, Basit Igtet, is organizing protests against both governments in Libya for the 25th of September 2017. Basit Igtet was an active member of the Libyan revolution in 2011 against Qaddafi. However, unlike other protests, Ikhwan influence has drastically decreased in both Syria and Egypt, meaning that wealthy Ikhwan support is more likely to be funded in Libya which, with the rise of Haftar Al-Khalifa, could very easily escalate into a new level of violence.

Since the Arab Spring, one of the problems with a decrease in violence and instability in one country is a corresponding increase in another. It may just be that, in the next few months, it will be Libya's turn to churn instability and chaos previously unimaginable under the former regime of Moammar Al-Qaddafi. Out of such instability and chaos, yet another terrorist organization may be formed.

After Syria, terrorism increase in Libya likely

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438605/hillary-clinton-benghazi-scandal-arming-syrian-rebels

According to Wikileaks, when Libyan President Moammar Al-Qaddafi was overthrown, his weapons were looted and taken to Syria. The insurgency in Libya died down, and most jihadists went to fight Bashar Al-Assad in Syria.

The results of such decisions by the US State Department are shocking. Syrian rebels overwhelmingly pledged allegiance to ISIS, invaded western and northern Iraq and declared a Caliphate.

Now, after 3 years of US intervention and after 2 years of Russian intervention in Syria, ISIS is almost defeated in Iraq and almost destroyed in Syria. ISIS will still remain a potent threat to Iraq, but in Syria, so long as Bashar Al-Assad remains in power, ISIS is highly unlikely to return.

Now the tables are turned. The only area of dominance for anti-Assad rebels are in Idlib, where Al-Qaeda has managed a complete takeover of the Syrian Opposition. With an Al-Qaeda takeover certain in Idlib, the Trump Administration has given Russia permission to destroy them unhindered.

But after Idlib, it would be foolish to expect that violence will correspondingly decrease across the Middle-East. In 2013, Mohammed Morsi was overthrown, and while stability returned to Egypt for a time, instability increased in Syria, Iraq and Libya in 2014. With Syria set to be cleared of jihadists and Iraq set for a lull in the fighting, conflicts in Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan will all intensify.

But Libya is the last bastion of the US-intervened Arab Spring. Jihadists, though failing in Syria, might instead return to Libya to make sure Islamism rules somewhere in the Arab world.

What happens in Idlib may determine what happens in Libya. Should Turkey close its borders to Idlib in the ensuing conflict between Al-Qaeda and the Syrian government, then Libya would have less to fear. However, should Turkey allow jihadists to flee Syria only to regroup in Libya, then the people of Libya will suffer enormously, and a new terror organisation could rear its ugly head in Libya.

Turkey could send Syrian Al-Qaeda militants to Libya to shore up the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan forces there. Having lost Ikhwan dominance in Syria and Egypt, Libya is one of the last bastions of instability through which Ikhwan could take over, benefiting Turkish influence in the Arab world.

Added to the conundrum is the current crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia supports the Tobruk government in the east, while Turkey and Qatar both support the Government of National Accord in Libya and the largely Ikhwan militants which back it. For Qatar, Libya might be a way to get back at Saudi Arabia for alienating it from the GCC.

Like Iraq in 2014, escalated violence in Libya may come as a complete shock to the western world. But it will likely be another example of fallout from President Obama's Arab Spring policies, which have failed spectacularly and caused more damage to the Arab world than even the Iraq War.

US leaflets undermine Afghan War

Though well known for patriotism, the US continue to have an abysmal handling of foreign policy in the Middle-East.

Days ago, leaflets were dispatched in Parwan Province, north of Kabul, in which a lion was devouring a dog. Unfortunately, the Taliban's logo, "There is no god but God and Mohammed is God's Messenger" was embedded on the dog, while the US was portrayed as the lion.

The reason this causes such a problem is that this slogan of the Taliban is also the shahaada, the proclamation a person says to become a Muslim. It is in Arabic, considered by Afghans the language of God. But a dog is considered spiritually unclean and defiled. Combining a dog with the perceived words of God is definitely ill advised.

Far more beneficial would have been to design a pamphlet with Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundaza riding a dog into battle, while the US and Afghans riding lions to defeat him. The Afghans would have laughed and got the message.

Either these leaflets were distributed by accident, or it was an act of sabotage from within the military and/or Trump Administration. President Trump wants to win the Afghan war, but not everyone within the Administration and military would benefit from a victory in Afghanistan. Some US politicians are bought out by China, a benefactor from a US defeat in Afghanistan, so their priorities lie elsewhere.

This is a blow to decisive victory in Afghanistan. Whether President Trump is able to deal with this foreign policy blunder effectively will determine the outcome of the war during his Presidency.

Haftar Al-Khalifa and Israel

Haftar Al-Khalifa, the strong man winning the Libyan civil war, is cultivating stronger ties with Israel, according to the following article:

http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/haftar-israeli-military-aid-strongman-reveals-new-friend-libya-1638239413

This represents a pattern which continues to occur post-Arab Spring: Sunni Arab countries are looking to Israel for their national security. With the increase of Iranian dominance, this increase is noticeable between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and with the fall of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, Sisi has also cultivated strong ties with Israel.

It also exposes the false narrative of an implicit alliance between Israel and Salafi/Ikwani terrorism. While this is certainly conclusive in Syria, this does not hold true in every Arab conflict. In the cases of Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE, terrorists hinder Israeli influence, not help. Israel prefers strongmen wary of terrorism and Iran, but would rather Salafi or Ikhwani terrorists to Iranian allied states.

As for Libya, this is good news: Haftar sending signals to Israel means the US will be less inclined to condemn Khalifa and Russia for stabilizing the country and create less hostility.

Afghanistan Strategy to wait until after ISIS?

It might be that the reason the Trump Administration is taking so long on a strategy for winning the Afghan war is because they wish to see ISIS defeated first.

Bush and Obama both began their presidencies more interested in Afghanistan, yet ended up more invested in Iraq; for Bush it was invading Iraq 18 months after Afghanistan and for Obama, it was returning to Iraq to defeat ISIS in 2014. Trump may just be doing the opposite: beginning his presidency more interested in Iraq and ending up more invested in Afghanistan.

Certainly the long Afghan policy review is welcome news for many, as it is always better to have a plan thoroughly reviewed and scrutinized before being implemented. But it might also be because the President's priorities are elsewhere in foreign policy: first with ISIS but also with North Korea.

The end of the war on ISIS is in sight. Raqqa is surrounded by the Syrian Kurds. The Syrian Arab Army is decimating ISIS across the desert of eastern Syria. Mosul has been retaken by the Iraqi Army. Tel Afar, Hawija and western Anbar are ISIS' last strongholds in Iraq. Abadi and Trump have agreed to keeping a residual US force in Iraq after the defeat of ISIS. Trump has stated the US is not going into Syria to remove Bashar Al-Assad.

Though Trump has said that after ISIS is defeated, he would spend more time invested in rebuilding America, in Afghanistan glints a desire to outshine Obama: Obama withdrew from Iraq in 2011, to return 3 years later to a country decimated by ISIS. Can Trump win a Bush-era war where Obama could not? He campaigned hard against the Obama doctrine, and is making all the right moves to push the US to victory in Afghanistan.

But it may just be that we will not see a coherent policy on Afghanistan until ISIS is defeated.

Why Trump will not leave Afghanistan

There has been talk in the White House about leaving Afghanistan altogether. But Trump will not leave Afghanistan.

This ploy by Trump - suggesting to leave Afghanistan - is to get his cabinet to think seriously about how to win the war there. Threatening to pull out puts their toes to the fire and forces them to come up with a different solution.

Some progress has been made in Afghan War policy. Trump has escalated strikes on the Taliban and the Islamic State of Afghanistan; policy reviews have included criticism of Pakistan's double game, making sure Afghanistan does not become another client state of Iran or Russia and, crucially, given the United States an economic reason to stay in Afghanistan: minerals, which the Taliban make part of their living off.

What should be undeniable - but currently is not - is that the Taliban can be beaten so long as their economic supply is strangled and border control between Afghanistan and Pakistan is strengthened. Most of the money the Taliban makes is from narcotics, secondly from minerals - if both of these fell into the hands of the government, this would make the difference needed to push tribes away from supporting the Taliban and back to the government.

In fact, narcotics in the hands of the Afghan and US forces could go some way to destabilizing Iran if they were sold to Iranians on the black market.

Trump will not leave Afghanistan because to leave would be to do exactly what Obama did with Iraq in 2011, something Trump campaigned against. Winning a Bush-era war where Obama could not would be icing on the cake for Trump's Presidency.

In any case, the US staying in Afghanistan is good for the Middle-East. It keeps the US military industrial complex churning, allows Russia more influence in countries like Syria, Libya and, in the future, Yemen, and deprives Iran, Al-Qaeda and ISIS a safe haven in another country.

But, as Trump well knows, the Afghan war must be won, or else Afghanistan will become the US' next Vietnam. And Trump will do everything he can to make sure that doesn't happen, for veterans and for America First.

Why Pakistan is an enemy of the US

The Pakistani government has been an enemy of the United States.

Nuclear armed, the Pakistani government gives regular funding and sanctuary to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants. Osama Bin Laden himself was found in Pakistan.

Pakistan is the reason why the Afghan War has dragged on for so long. Terrified of an independent Afghanistan, Pakistan has been continually funding the Taliban, because so long as Afghanistan is a weak nation, Pakistan is strong and India can be held at bay.

Indian dominance terrifies Pakistan more than anything else. But the US is getting tired of Pakistan playing a double-game and, under Trump, expect US-Indian-Afghani relations to improve.

So long as the Pakistan problem is not dealt with, the Afghan war will never end. The only way to end the Afghan War is to step up Afghani-Pakistani border control between to prevent any members of the Taliban from getting into or out of either country.

Immense pressure needs to be applied on Pakistan to force it to sever ties with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.

Russia, for example, already showed how to do this with Turkey: in Syria, Russian air power dominated the Turkish-backed rebels and forced them to retreat on almost every front. Turkey then shot down a Russian jet and in response Russia escalated its campaign against the rebels and severed all ties with Turkey. Turkey then repaired ties with both Russia and the Assad Government when it realised its previous foreign policy had completely failed and it was at risk at losing even more outright with the Kurds on its border.

Pakistan needs America much more than America needs Pakistan. Should America move to annihilate the Taliban, increase Afghani-Pakistani border security and increase US-Indian-Afghani ties, Pakistan will come to the negotiating table and even sever ties with the Taliban. But it will only do so if the US shows military might and crushes Pakistani proxies completely.

This is why it seems Trump's regional approach to Afghanistan may succeed where Obama's and Bush's did not. Trump may win the Afghan war by forcing Pakistan to stop acting as an enemy of the US.

Trump reaffirms support to Afghanistan

For more information, see the link below:

http://www.khaama.com/trump-speaks-with-president-ghani-after-deadly-kabul-explosion-02839



In the wake of the ISIS terror attack on Kabul which left 80 people dead, Trump has rung Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and reaffirmed US support of the government and the commitment to ending terrorism there.

Trump ran an historic Presidential campaign, in which his slogan was often "America First." There are those who are wondering how getting tangled back in the Afghan quagmire benefits the US and whether Trump should just withdraw from the country altogether.

I say no. I would be glad for Trump to stay in Afghanistan, the reason being that military resources tied up in both Afghanistan and Iraq are less spared for other military temptations, such as in Syria, Iran, Yemen, Libya or North Korea. Trump starting new wars while withdrawing from old ones, as Obama did, would be a very dark and foolish idea.

Better would be for Trump to pass up on newer military opportunities (such as temptations in Syria, Iran, Yemen, Libya or North Korea) in favour of winning the old ones. One of the things Trump spoke of on the campaign trail was "winning" and "winning big." It would, therefore, stick with Trump's campaign rhetoric if he stayed in Afghanistan to win the war by rapidly changing the conditions upon which said war is played on.

The Trump Administration has been all too willing to do that. In the last 6 months, the Afghan question has been carefully studied and pondered in the hope of finding a way to win the war there. While rapidly defeating ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Trump has taken his time regarding Afghanistan to make sure nothing rash is done there.

Not only has there been careful and deliberate thinking about the Afghan question - Pakistan has been sharply slapped on the wrist for supporting the Taliban. They have lost hundreds of millions of dollars in funding from the US - more recently, in his historic counter-terrorism speech in Saudi Arabia, Trump did not even mention Pakistan as a partner. The Trump Administration has been clearly sending signals to Pakistan that, should they remain in implicit support of the Taliban, they would lose the US as a close ally.

This reaffirmation of support for the Afghan government does not suggest a neo-con change in Trump - rather, it represents an entirely different policy to Obama: seeking to win old wars, not start new ones.