The Empire of the United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates, one small nation in the Gulf Cooperation Council, is now the dominant political force of the Arab world.

The UAE is the primary backer for autocracy in the Middle-East. Its funding and influence was first noted in 2013, when the Egyptian military overthrew the Ikhwan government of Mohammed Morsi. Since then the UAE has additionally backed the Kurds in Syria, Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya and the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen. The UAE is also responsible for the rise of Mohammed Bin Salman, now Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia.

However, there are signs that the UAE's empire has reached its limit. In December 2015 Libya's Government of National Accord was formed and, earlier this year, Turkey militarily intervened to save the GNA from UAE-backed Haftar Al-Khalifa. Since 2016 in Syria, the Russians have permitted Turkish intervention against the Kurds in exchange for consolidation of the Syrian Government over rebel-held areas.

But the UAE's most ambitious project is its support for the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen. After militarily intervening with Saudi Arabia in support of Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the UAE has diverged from previous policy by using the STC as its proxy in Southern Yemen. This has caused a war within a war: while President Hadi's forces wage war with the Houthis in the north, the STC is waging war with President Hadi's forces in the south.

The outcome most favourable to the UAE in Yemen can be summed up in two consolidations: first, the military, political and economic consolidation of the STC over all of Southern Yemen; second, the consolidation of President Hadi's forces and government solely into Northern Yemen. Then President Hadi would become a pawn of the STC: President Hadi's forces and government would be used to militarily occupy the Houthis' attention in the north, while the STC consolidates its own position politically and economically in the south.

However, it is Turkey which represents the greatest threat to UAE-backed autocracy. Eventually, in Syria, Turkey will be forced to cede control of Idlib and its occupied zone northeast of Idlib - in return, Russia will acquiesce to Turkey's full political control over Libya and a further Turkish invasion of the US-Kurdish zone in northeast Syria. Decimating the Kurds in Syria and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya might be enough to guarantee the end of both wars - but it would mean the UAE would lose two of its valuable proxies.

Time, now, is the crucial factor in determining whether or not Yemen will be added to Turkey's list of conquests. Should the Syrian and Libyan conflicts be resolved before the UAE irons out its position in Yemen, Yemen would become a springboard from which the United Arab Emirates would be threatened as never before. But, given the US still has its presence in Syria, the UAE might be able to salvage its position in Yemen before Turkey and Russia reach their expected compromise.

In Libya and Yemen, Turkey is on the march

Turkey is strengthening its geostrategic position before being forced to make compromises.

In the last few months, Turkey has defended its position in Syria's Idlib from Russia, Iranian and Syrian incursion, sent crucial supply and aid to Libya's Government of National Accord and, via Turkish charities, has consolidated its position in Yemen, which is embroiled in conflict.

Turkey is no fan of the Trump Administration's policies in the Middle-East. Traditional balance between the autocratic and Islamist halves of the Middle-East has been rejected. Instead, the Trump Administration has thrown its weight behind the autocratic half of the Sunni Middle-East, supporting policies conducive for Israel, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates in particular. This has resulted in the rise of Mohammed Bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, support for the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds and acquiescence given to Liban strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa and separatists in Yemen's south.

But against the odds, Turkey is still pursuing its agenda in Syria, Libya and Yemen. Over the tenure of the Trump Administration, Turkey has successfully scaled back US support for the Syrian Kurds and made inroads on autocratic spheres of influence in Libya and Yemen. For those who support autocratic rule in the Middle-East, most worryingly of all is the increasing economic and military ties between Turkey and Russia. Tied together with the coming Cold War between the United States and China, the Turkish and Russian-Iranian spheres of influence in the Middle-East are likely to reach a compromise favourable to China and unfavourable to the United States.

This will likely mean Syria will be resolved in an outcome favourable to Russia and Iran and less favourable to Turkey. Eventually, rebel-held Idlib will have to fall to the Syrian government. In exchange, Turkey will likely occupy the last US-held areas in Syria and be allowed by Russia to liquidate the Syrian Kurds.

Should the fall of Idlib occur, Turkey is likely to have an even larger Syrian refugee problem than it has already. Because of this, Iran, Russia and China are likely to ease the economic fallout. Russia already has significant economic ties with Turkey and has successfully delivered its S-400 missile system there. Though Turkey will likely incur US sanctions for using the S-400 missile system and will also likely be expelled from NATO, China and Iran will step in economically and help ease the pressure of US sanctions. Then Turkey would likely be given the green light for eroding autocratic influence in both Libya and Yemen.

For Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, this is a nightmare scenario. If Turkey falls into the Sino-Russian sphere of influence, allows the Syrian civil war to end and also dominates the Sunni Arab governments of Libya and Yemen, the potential for conflict to be ignited in Saudi Arabia and Iraq is compounded. Conflict between Iran and the United States in Iraq would loom large, and Mohammed Bin Salman would be outmaneuvered in Yemen by its Turkish competitor. Egypt would have a Muslim Brotherhood government to contend with to its west and an unstable Saudi Arabia to its east.

Of all players in Yemen, Turkey has the best chance for negotiating peace between the Iran-backed Houthis and President Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi. But should President Hadi turn its back on Saudi Arabia in favour of Turkey, Saudi Arabia will be threatened as never before from its Yemeni border, from Iran and from Qatar. The risk to Saudi Arabia for conflict is greater even than the risk in Iraq.

The timing of US sanctions on Turkey will determine when exactly this nightmare scenario will occur. For Syria, Libya and Yemen, this will likely mean an end to the fighting. For the United States, it will be forced to keep its attention on the Middle-East for many decades to come.

Libya's place in Cold War 2

Libya is an essential cog in the coming Cold War between China and the United States.

Recently, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan sent arms and Syrian militias to support the Government of National Accord in Libya. By doing so, President Erdogan saved the Libyan government from General Haftar Al-Khalifa's forces, which were marching on the capital Tripoli. Such a move was long ago predicted in this blog:

https://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2018/01/after-failures-in-egypt-syria-erdogan.html

In response, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates and France formed an international anti-Turkey alliance in the Mediterranean. Such a move was obviously condemned by Turkey, and it shows Turkish influenced being challenged as never before by western powers.

Prior to Turkish moves in Libya, in Syria, Russian, Syrian and Iranian forces marched on rebel-held Idlib. As a result, several Turkish soldiers in Idlib's Observation Posts were killed: in retaliation, Turkey unleashed a barrage of fire on approaching Iranian and Syrian targets, only to be stopped by a cease-fire deal reached between President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

So far, President Putin has been unable to completely reconcile Turkey to its vision for Syria and, until he achieves this, will be unable to secure victory in Syria. But all President Putin has to do is wait. Turkey is insuring that, eventually, it will have to give in to Russian interests in Syria - even if at a price not entirely palatable to Russia.

The Russian strategy has always been to try and get Turkey on side in Syria. Frustratingly for the international anti-Turkey alliance, Libya is likely to part of a deal between Russia and Turkey. That Russia and Syria are not part of the international anti-Turkish alliance is curious, given President Putin and Bashar Al-Assad have both backed General Haftar against Turkish interest there, and points to a mutual understanding between Russia and Turkey of their ultimate geostrategy in the Mediterranean.

More ominously for western powers, China is likely to weigh in on Middle-Eastern affairs as never before. As Cold War 2 begins between China and the United States, wresting Turkey from the American sphere of influence would greatly change the geostrategy of the entire region in favour of China and Russia. China putting its weight behind Turkey would mean China would also support Turkish moves to dominate all of Libya.

In exchange, Turkey would be able to turn on the S-400 Russian missile defense system, which is compatible with Russian and Chinese military hardware; as the United States sanctions Turkey for such a move, Turkey would receive substantial financial assistance from China. Turkey would then have to give up control of Syria's Idlib and be allowed to defeat the remnants of the PKK in Syria, forcing the United States out of Syria altogether and giving Russia, Iran and Syria their much-needed victory in Idlib.

Such a grand bargain would reverberate throughout the region for many decades to come. In response to such moves, the United States would likely throw its weight behind the international anti-Turkey alliance, and the western bloc of the Middle-East would be formed against the Chinese-led block: China, Russia, Turkey, Libya, Syria and Iran.

Should China, Russia and Turkey iron out their differences in the region, not only would they be able to outmaneuver their western opponents in Syria and Libya: they would be able to prepare for the next round of proxy wars. After a complete US withdrawal from Syria under Sino, Russian, Turkish and domestic pressure, a war between the United States and Iran for control of Iraq becomes more likely. Additionally, to keep Egyptian interest away from a Turkey-dominated Libya, instability could be fomented instead in Saudi Arabia. With Iran and Turkey supporting various rebel forces in Syria and Libya, such forces could be transferred to Saudi Arabia for the ultimate prize.

Should US President Donald Trump continue on his current course in the Middle-East and against China, this is the likely scenario. Ignoring Libya, staying in Syrian oilfields long after the defeat of ISIS and not meeting Turkish strategic interest is likely to cause a cataclysmic challenge to the Trump doctrine on the Middle-East, and is more likely to see victory in favour of Russia and China.

Al-Qaeda and a stalemate in Yemen

It is no secret that the devastating Yemen war is a stalemate.

The Houthis still control the majority of Northern Yemen, the more populous half of the country. The recent threat of operations against Hodeidah, the Houthis' largest port in Yemen, is a strategy by the Saudi-led coalition to give it an edge over the Houthis.

But to break the stalemate, the coalition is trying more than just the threat of operations in Hodeidah. Increasing intelligence reports show that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the largest terrorist organization in the region, has been covertly enlisted against the Houthis in Northern Yemen, even while the UAE leads military offensives against the same organization in the south of the country.

As highlighted in a previous article [see http://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2017/12/yemen-next-islamic-state-update-2018.html] the aim of the tribes in Southern Yemen is to use Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [or AQAP] to weaken Northern Yemen to such an extent that Southern Yemen will be able to become an independent nation. This requires AQAP to be driven out of the south while also being encouraged to relocate to the north, receiving funding, arms and guaranteed protection from counter-terrorism agencies.

As Al-Qaeda was driven out of Saudi Arabia exclusively into Yemen in 2006, so the coalition hopes to see Al-Qaeda driven out of Southern Yemen exclusively into the north, keeping two enemies of Saudi Arabia - the Houthis and AQAP - at each other's throats.

This would lead Southern Yemen to a status of superiority over Northern Yemen, similar to Pakistan over Afghanistan or Turkey over Syria. This would force Northern Yemen into endless internal conflicts between AQAP, the Houthis and the government, while Southern Yemen continues to consolidate a position of strength with help from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

This may even lead Southern Yemen to be allowed to join the Gulf Cooperation Council, leaving Northern Yemen reeling from poverty, terrorism, chaos and more war. Should the Saudi-led coalition's strategy prove successful, Southern Yemen's future looks as bright as Northern Yemen's future looks bleak.

Should AQAP be driven out of Southern Yemen exclusively into the north, Saudi Arabia would have little to fear from the organization as it would be preoccupied in Northern Yemen and turn to destabilize Southern Yemen before Saudi Arabia. But the success of this strategy depends on how permanently AQAP is driven from Southern Yemen, as well as a successful secession of the south, which is still by no means a certain prospect.

UAE overreach in Tunisia to have grave consequences for Libya

For those hoping the end of the Libyan civil war was in sight, previous developments in Tunisia are particularly worrying.

Several months ago Libyan strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa secured Derna, the most conservative city in the country's east. This city, previously taken by ISIS before being driven out by other Islamist militias, served as a severe handicap on the Libyan National Army's ability to drive into either the west or south of the country. Now that the city is secure, Haftar can attack west or south as he chooses.

But in Tunisia in June, the UAE sponsored an attempted military coup. The UAE has long been a supporter of autocracy in the region, supporting Abdul Feteh As-Sisi's rise to power in Egypt, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman's rise in Saudi Arabia, the Southern Movement in Yemen, the attempted military coup in Turkey and, of course, Libyan strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa.

The attempted coup in Tunisia will very likely have a drastic impact on how the North African neighbour views developments in Libya in favour of Haftar Al-Khalifa. In short, UAE's funding of an attempted military coup in Tunisia backfired in a classic case of strategic overreach.

This is likely to have grave consequences for Libya. Tunisia views the militias in power in Tripoli and western Libya as a bulwark against UAE-backed autocracy and will be less cautious about Islamist ambitions in the region, spearheaded by Turkey, Qatar and Sudan.

Because of this, it is unlikely that Haftar Al-Khalifa will try and wrest control of western Libya in the short-term. The next target for the Libyan National Army will likely be the country's lawless south.

But even military operations in the south pose problems. Smuggling from western Libya - and, by extension, Tunisia - could give covert support to terrorist groups like ISIS which would keep Haftar distracted in a long, bloody battle for southern Libya at the expense of the west.

Worse still, Sudan, an important partner in the Qatari-Turkish axis, borders Libya in the south. Should Tunisia more actively side with the Turkey, Qatar and Sudan in the Libyan proxy war, as seems likely, terrorism could spike in Libya as it has done in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. For Tunisia, the calculation is likely to be that terrorism is an easier threat to manage than the threat of regime change from their military.

While global attention remains on Iraqi elections, the Syrian civil war and the devastation in Yemen, Libya may unexpectedly heat up and destabilize. This may turn southern and western Libya into terrorist hubs as deadly as Afghanistan before 9-11.

Forgotten Middle-East Update - Qatar

Qatar is the way through which instability is likely to rear its ugly head in the Arabian Gulf.

Due to the embargo imposed by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, Qatar's own economy is under threat. While short-term things are unlikely to change in the small Arabian nation, mid-term to long-term the embargo is likely to negatively impact not only Qatar but the surrounding Arabian Gulf region.

The result of such an embargo has been that Qatar has strengthened relations with both Iran and Turkey, both of which are adversities to the four countries involved in the embargo. Through Qatar's current predicament, Iran and Turkey have been brought closer to the Arabian Gulf than ever before.

As the geopolitics of the Middle-East continue to realign, relations will continue to deteriorate in the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the council itself is likely to be disbanded and recreated under a different name - with Qatar excluded. Such a move is likely to benefit Iraq, which may end up swapping places with Qatar and, for Iraq, instead of being the pro-Iranian outcast, may be brought into a new Gulf Council. Qatar would then be the new pro-Iranian outcast, bringing more open hostility from its neighbours than ever.

Before such hostilities are brought to bear in the Arabian Gulf itself, they are likely to be settled in a preliminary proxy war in Libya. (Such a dress rehearsal is reminiscent of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930's, which was the prelude to the longer, bloodier conflict between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1940's.) As the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have been winding down, countries like Libya are becoming increasingly unstable. This conflict has pitted autocrats against Islamists - which is the classic UAE/Saudi-versus-Qatar rivalry. As violence continues to recede elsewhere, such hostilities are likely to escalate severely in Libya.

The conflict in Libya would either end in a victory for the autocrats - led by Haftar Al-Khalifa - or a less-likely victory for the Islamists. The only way the Islamists would win in Libya would be if another nation got involved, such as Turkey, either through a direct military confrontation or through the funneling of supplies and foreign fighters from its own land - which was used in Syria - into Libya.

After the Libyan civil war is concluded, either way, instability will arrive at the Arabian Gulf. Should Turkey continue to militarily back Qatar and make sure that the Ikhwan philosophy survives in the Middle-East, eventually the Arabs will no longer tolerate Turkish meddling in Qatar, and a war would ensue between previously American allies - namely, Turkey and Saudi Arabia - which would tear the Arabian Gulf to pieces.

Saudi Arabia's Mohammed Bin Salman is facing increasing pressure in his proxy wars in Yemen, Qatar and Iraq (the latter two being economic proxy wars instead of military). Should insufficient progress be made on any of these fronts, the Saudi Crown Prince would have to make a game-changing decision: either more directly fund Al-Qaeda in Yemen to win the war against the Houthis, or militarily occupy Qatar and force regime change. Though former is more likely, Mohammed Bin Salman's own impulsive foreign policy would be wise not to underestimate.

Forgotten Middle-East Update - Yemen and Libya

In Syria, Bashar Al-Assad is consolidating control, while Iranian influence is being rolled back from the Syrian-Israeli border and Trump wants to withdraw - meanwhile in Iraq, anti-American Shi'ite cleric Muqtada As-Sadr has won the largest number of seats in the election and is set to make a coalition government with Haider Al-Abadi's party.

As the known conflicts in Iraq and Syria continue to deescalate, other conflicts are escalating.

The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is poised to start an offensive to take port Hodeida from Houthi control, a move which would cripple northern Yemen's already dwindling food supplies. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda continues to thwart the US-anti-terrorist strategy in the country's southeast, while in the north the terror group is flourishing in the absence of effective government. Yemeni President Hadi is only nominally in control of Yemen, while Houthis, Al-Qaeda, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the Southern Movement control different parts of the country.

In Libya, though the As-Sirraj government and the Libyan National Army headed by Haftar Al-Khalifa have agreed to hold elections, the situation in Libya is exacerbating. Haftar's forces have surrounded the city of Derna - Derna being a city like Iraq's Fallujah: a city that even in the days of the dictator was hard to control.

Meanwhile, the situation in Libya's Tripolitania is made tense by the growing rift between the Sirraj government and the militias in control of various parts of the region. It may be that the coming elections will force any legitimate government out of Tripolitania altogether and propel the militias into effective control, much as the Syrian Opposition has tried to do in Syria's Idlib. But, like Syria's opposition forces, the Libyan Shura councils and militias have links to groups as extreme as Al-Qaeda and ISIS - and, with the Syrian conflict winding down, many Islamists will continue to see Libya as the ultimate destination for establishing Shariah and waging jihad.

If such regional explosion in north-western Libya were not troubling enough, the conflict in the country's south is threatening to create space in which ISIS may rise in Libya for a third time. After being defeated in the cities Derna and Sirte, ISIS has fled to the south of the country and largely fallen silent. But the resentment of African Libyans in the south against their Arab counterparts in the north may be exactly the sort of thing ISIS needs to make a comeback in the country.

Though this in itself may be troubling, more troubling still is that the tribes in southern Libya are linked to other tribes across the region, such as in northern Chad, northeastern Niger and northwestern Sudan. Should ISIS succeed in winning the protection of tribes in the south of Libya, this protection would spread and ignite a regional explosion - one which would mean that ISIS would once again be breaking borders, this time between Libya, Chad and Niger, with assistance from terror groups Boko Haram and Ash-Shabab.

As Iraq and Syria continue to recover from years and years of war, Libya and Yemen continue to worsen. The instability in the region is not gone - it has only shifted.