Erdogan eyes Libya after failures in Egypt, Syria

For Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan represents a revival of the Ottoman Empire and a rejection of the Ataturk secular state. As a result, Ikhwan ideology has been spreading across the Middle-East at a more rapid rate, with the Arab Spring initially providing perfect fuel for Erdogan's ambitions.

However, in Egypt and Syria in particular, Turkish support for the Ikhwan has backfired badly.

Though Egyptian Ikhwan leader Mohammed Morsi was elected in 2012, a year later he was overthrown in a military coup, a coup aided by the largest protests in history. Ikhwan had completely lost the support of the Egyptian people, and President Erdogan suffered a serious setback in his ambition to recreate the Ottoman Empire.

Though Libya looked promising for the Ikhwan and Turkey after the overthrow of Moammar Al-Qaddafi in 2011, military strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa broke ranks with the Islamist factions in Tripoli and set up a rival government in Tobruk in 2014. Since then, Haftar has regained much territory in Libya, with north-western Libya as the exception.

Syria was where the Turkish-Ikhwan policy was pushed hardest with the least results. Qatari-Turkish funding gave weapons to rebel groups so extreme they had more in common with ISIS than even the most extreme elements of Al-Qaeda. It is not hard to see, then, that these groups never had much support from the Syrian people.

With the regional shift caused by the impending peace process in Syria, President Erdogan is likely to lose much influence in Syria as well. Currently the Syrian Arab Army, Russia, Iran and Hezbollah are forcing many of the Syrian rebels out of other regions and into Idlib, which has caused an enormous receding of violence in the region.

However, what President Erdogan has lost in Syria and Egypt he has a chance to regain in Libya. Recently in Tunisia he boasted that he was planning a political settlement in Libya, while also refusing to accept Bashar Al-Assad as the legitimate ruler in Syria. To Russia, President Erdogan is sending a clear message: Assad only stays in Syria if Turkey receives enough compensation.

Such compensation for Turkey would include the dismantling of Kurdish militias in north-eastern Syria, and may even include the relocation of rebel fighters and armaments from Syrian Idlib province to Libya via Turkey.

The reason why such rebel fighters and armaments may be relocated to Libya is because Turkey has acted as a transit for jihad between Syria and Libya before. At the conclusion of the Libyan uprising against Moammar al-Qaddafi, many of the weapons used in Libya were relocated to Syria, to put more pressure on the Assad government:

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/440822/hillary-clinton-scandals-libya-prosecutions-undermined

Worryingly for Turkey, many of the fighters for the Syrian Opposition are foreigners. Should Turkey lose Idlib to President Assad in the peace settlement, those foreigners may turn their weapons on Turkey without another option.

Libyan strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa is exactly the sort of figure against which foreign fighters from Syria would desire to wage jihad. With relations improving between Turkey and the Libyan Government of National Accord - the UN-recognized Libyan government with ties to the Ikhwan - the war in Libya may be escalated by a concluded political settlement in Syria: one where Russia allows President Assad full control of Syria, while Turkey is allowed more influence in Libya.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has shown resilience in the face of setbacks to his original plans for control of the Middle-East. This resilience shows that Turkey under its present leadership cannot be trusted to act as a stabilizing force, and all its actions should be scrutinized as a means for further chaos in the region.

ISIS Threat to South Asia made large by Pakistan, US peace efforts

ISIS has been defeated militarily in Syria and has been driven into hiding in Iraq.

The terror organization took the limelight from Al-Qaeda after taking over Mosul in 2014, establishing a Caliphate over one third of Iraq and one half of Syria at its height. It split with Al-Qaeda in 2013 for being too brutal and for not confining operations to Iraq but spilling over into Syria against Al-Qaeda factions there.

Since then, Russian peace efforts in Syria and the US war on ISIS in Iraq have driven ISIS out of Syria and into hiding in Iraq. But the organization is resilient, better funded than Al-Qaeda and a more appealing alternative for millennials in waging jihad.

While the long-term ISIS risk to the Arabian Gulf and to Iraq cannot be overstated, the organization has been looking short-term to other areas in which to expand its influence. In Yemen it has been largely unsuccessful. In Libya and the Egyptian Sinai peninsula, it has managed to garner enough support to grow as an insurgency.

But Afghanistan is where ISIS is, alarmingly, set to grow beyond an insurgency. President Trump's strategy on winning the Afghan war is the best yet seen from an American president, but as the Taliban are relentlessly hunted and their finances targeted, the Taliban is more likely to splinter: one part will return to Ashraf Ghani's government, the other part will look elsewhere for support and funding - namely, ISIS.

Many ISIS fighters have relocated to Afghanistan. According to Russian sources, the number is as high as 10,000, one third of the US estimates of ISIS numbers at its height in Iraq and Syria:

https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-afghanistan-islamic-state/4176497.html

The reason there are so many more ISIS fighters going into Afghanistan than to Libya, Egypt or Yemen is Pakistan. Like Turkey into Syria, Pakistan has a long history of sending Islamist militants over their border into Afghanistan, to destabilize the region and keep India at bay.

With the Taliban on the back foot and the US putting Pakistan on notice, Pakistan is not only continuing to send militants into Afghanistan - it is escalating its campaign by allowing ISIS fighters into Afghanistan.

These policies from Pakistan and the Trump Administration risk a short-term ISIS takeover of several regions in Afghanistan. While this would certainly decimate Al-Qaeda in its homeland, it risks sending South Asia into a new, deadlier conflict: one which has a real chance of backfiring on Pakistan.

Should ISIS militants gain territory in Afghanistan and should more political pressure be put on Pakistan by the Trump Administration, Islamist insurgency in Pakistan would very likely increase. ISIS are more violent than their Al-Qaeda counterparts, and this may tip Pakistan over the edge where Al-Qaeda and the Taliban could not.

Yet for Afghanistan, the ISIS presence is less likely to lead to a terrorist takeover and more likely to be temporary. It is Pakistan rather than Afghanistan that is at risk of long-term instability caused by ISIS, especially as Pakistan is showing no signs of relenting in its dangerous foreign policy.

Yemen: the next Islamic State UPDATE 2018

Previously published here:

http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com.au/2017/02/yemen-next-islamic-state-2017-update_28.html

Since the 21st of April 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against Zaidi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in an attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power.  In the subsequent chaos of the Yemen War, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both President Hadi and the Zaidi Houthi rebels.

And it is not ISIS.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining most out of the chaos of Saudi Arabia's Yemen war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War (2003) and built up in the Syrian Civil War (2011), AQAP is building its momentum as a direct result of Saudi intervention. And like ISIS, AQAP is underestimated by the group utilizing them.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, though dangerous, is perceived by Saudi Arabia as the 'lesser of two evils' against the Houthis and thus receives aid to fight the Zaidi rebels. AQAP has since emerged as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.

It is unlikely that AQAP would attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes working with the group have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an alliance with Iraqi Ba’ath Party militants disenfranchised with America’s vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS’ aim in establishing a caliphate.

The tribes which back AQAP are largely tribes from Southern Yemen, a previously independent state known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. These tribes seek independence from (and the crippling of) the government based in Northern Yemen.

The UAE is already preparing for such independence to be achieved. With Yemeni President Hadi showing no signs of popularity on the ground, UAE is shifting its support to Aidarous Az-Zubaidi, a figurehead of the Southern Movement.

As with Sisi in Egypt and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, a regime change in Southern Yemen would mean that the tribes in Southern Yemen would become anti-Islamist, autocratic, and would force AQAP into the north exclusively.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been the most effective fighting force against the Houthis. Whether Az-Zubaidi or Hadi rule from Southern Yemen, AQAP will continue gaining strongholds in Northern Yemen at the expense of the Houthis. This will likely weaken Northern Yemen sufficiently enough for the south to achieve its independence or dominance.

However, the threat posed by an AQAP-dominated northern Yemen is not to be underestimated. It threatens not only Southern Yemen and Saudi Arabia; it threatens to damage relations between the Saudi-led coalition and President Trump, who has no love for Al-Qaeda, ISIS or any Salafi terrorists.

But what President Trump does not realize is that there are few forces in the region capable of defeating the Houthis. Like in Iraq and Syria, moderate forces are highly unlikely to win this war: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or the Houthis are far stronger contenders.

Ali Abdullah Saleh dies, Yemeni conflict exacerbates

Forces allied with Ali Abdullah Saleh have recently broken out in fights with the Zaidi Houthi rebels. Ali Abdullah Saleh betrayed the Houthis and sought to mend ties with the Saudi coalition, to stop them from continuing to bomb Yemen and to bring peace to the troubled country.

But in recent hours Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed by the Houthis as he attempted to flee for Saudi Arabia.

This has been the most significant political change in the Yemeni conflict since its inception. With the splitting of the Houthi-Saleh alliance and with the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the powers that have held Sana'a for the past two and a half years have been torn apart.

As with the death of previous dictators, this will result in further fragmentation and conflict. However, unlike with the overthrow of previous Arab dictators, this fragmentation will have a post-mortem focus: ousting the Houthis from Sana'a.

Powers ranging from the Southern Movement, to Hadi, to Al-Qaeda, to Ali Abdullah Saleh's forces - all will be aimed unequivocally at ousting the Houthis from their strongholds in northern Yemen. Unfortunately, even with help from Saleh's forces, the Houthis are fearsome adversaries: the fighting will be bloody and drawn out.

There are many angles to consider for the next stage of the conflict. One is that the Southern Movement is still aiming for secession from the north, and with Saleh's forces and the Houthis fighting each other, there will be less forces able to resist the inevitable rendering of the south from the north. Ali Abdullah Saleh was the dictator who united the south to the north. With Saleh dead, there will be less incentive than ever for the south to stay with the north.

The other is that, apart from Saleh's forces, Al-Qaeda remains the most effective fighting force against the Houthis in Yemen. With Ali Abdullah Saleh dead, some of his forces will join the coalition and some will join Al-Qaeda. It is highly unlikely that any of Saleh's forces will mend their ties with the Houthis, nor will any ally with the Southern Movement. However, depending on when the south secedes from the north will depend on to what extent Saleh's forces ally with the coalition and to what extent they ally with Al-Qaeda.

Since 2015, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been using the conflict to expand its influence. With violence escalating as a result of the Saleh-Houthi divorce, Al-Qaeda will only get stronger. This is another reason why the south may secede from the north in the short-term rather than the long-term: the secessionists are being encouraged by the UAE to drive Al-Qaeda out of the south - the only other area where they would be tolerated is into the north exclusively against the Houthis.

In the north of Yemen, the conflict is about to get even worse. Northern Yemen is on the brink of famine, and the coalition is undoubtedly losing patience. The kind of vacuum created by Ali Abdullah Saleh's death in Northern Yemen is exactly the kind of vacuum in which terrorism thrives, and monsters like ISIS grow.

Yemen: Southern Movement used to reduce Al-Qaeda Threat

With backing from the UAE, the Southern Movement has been catapulted into Yemen politics' center stage.

While Saudi Arabia has been involved in an air campaign against the Houthis, to restore Saudi ally Hadi to power over all of Yemen, in the south of the country UAE has been politically allying with the Southern Movement. This is because Saudi Arabia's ally Hadi is as unpopular in the south as in the north, and for the UAE to make sure that neither Al-Qaeda nor the Houthis end up in control of Southern Yemen, bolstering efforts for the south to secede from the north is advantageous.

Before their unification in 1990, Yemen was two independent states: the more populous, mountainous north and the sparsely populated south. Due to the current Yemen war, aspirations for south secession have grown and, with UAE-backing, seem likely.

This would undoubtedly have consequences for the region. This would all at once increase governance in Southern Yemen and reduce Al-Qaeda's presence there. Under northern leadership, needs in the south have been largely ignored, meaning Al-Qaeda has long maintained its base in Southern Yemen through soft power tactics such as fixing basic services and building infrastructure. With priorities in Southern Yemen likely to be met by new leadership, Al-Qaeda will be forced to move elsewhere.

Dangerously, the only area left for Al-Qaeda to go is in Northern Yemen, against the Houthis. Should Saudi Arabia decide to continue the war against the Houthis, Al-Qaeda will end up the main foot soldiers against them, meaning that, even should Hadi regain control of Sana'a, most of his foot soldiers would be members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

There is a chance that a ceasefire will be implemented in Yemen, with the Houthis controlling the north and the Southerners controlling the south. But the Houthis are allied with Ali Abdullah Saleh, who in 1990 was the President who instigated the unification of Yemen. The Houthis, Al-Qaeda and the Southern Movement all stand to gain from continuing the conflict in the north, so Saudi Arabia may have no choice but to continue.

Should the south secede from the north, the new southern state may be encouraged to support Hadi in regaining control of Sana'a and establishing new borders between the two states. The south would be likely to support continued military efforts against the north, because as long as the north is weak, the south has the best chance of remaining a separate state.

However, Al-Qaeda stands to gain enormously. Should the south be complicit in sending their homegrown Al-Qaeda militants to fight the Houthis, this will only be advantageous in the short run. The northerners indoctrinated by Al-Qaeda, after the ousting of the Houthis and Hadi, will want revenge against the south. Southern separation from Yemen is a band aid on a fatal wound in the Arabian Peninsula.

After Egypt, Syria, will Ikhwan push for Libya?

The Ikhwan are the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, it has pushed for control of several countries: in 2012, the Ikhwan gained control of Egypt; in addition, throughout the Syrian Civil War, the Ikhwan monopolized on the violence to spread its message.

However both Egypt and Syria have ended in significant failure for the Ikhwan. In 2013 in Egypt, the Ikhwan Morsi government was overthrown. Since 2015, the rebels have been losing the Syrian civil war, and Turkey and Qatar, the two main backers of the Ikhwan worldview, have been brought to the negotiating table with Iran and Russia.

Since then, Saudi Arabia has targeted Qatar for support to Iran, the Ikhwan and Salafi groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. This has alienated Qatar from the GCC and has forced Iran and Turkey to intervene on the small Gulf nation's behalf.

While it is possible that the Ikhwan and Iranian political worlds will converge on Saudi Arabia, a more immediate proxy war is being waged in Libya: between the strongman government in the east of the country - backed by Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. - and the mainly Ikhwan government in the west - backed by Qatar, Turkey and the European Union.

A Libyan living in Switzerland, Basit Igtet, is organizing protests against both governments in Libya for the 25th of September 2017. Basit Igtet was an active member of the Libyan revolution in 2011 against Qaddafi. However, unlike other protests, Ikhwan influence has drastically decreased in both Syria and Egypt, meaning that wealthy Ikhwan support is more likely to be funded in Libya which, with the rise of Haftar Al-Khalifa, could very easily escalate into a new level of violence.

Since the Arab Spring, one of the problems with a decrease in violence and instability in one country is a corresponding increase in another. It may just be that, in the next few months, it will be Libya's turn to churn instability and chaos previously unimaginable under the former regime of Moammar Al-Qaddafi. Out of such instability and chaos, yet another terrorist organization may be formed.

After Syria, terrorism increase in Libya likely

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438605/hillary-clinton-benghazi-scandal-arming-syrian-rebels

According to Wikileaks, when Libyan President Moammar Al-Qaddafi was overthrown, his weapons were looted and taken to Syria. The insurgency in Libya died down, and most jihadists went to fight Bashar Al-Assad in Syria.

The results of such decisions by the US State Department are shocking. Syrian rebels overwhelmingly pledged allegiance to ISIS, invaded western and northern Iraq and declared a Caliphate.

Now, after 3 years of US intervention and after 2 years of Russian intervention in Syria, ISIS is almost defeated in Iraq and almost destroyed in Syria. ISIS will still remain a potent threat to Iraq, but in Syria, so long as Bashar Al-Assad remains in power, ISIS is highly unlikely to return.

Now the tables are turned. The only area of dominance for anti-Assad rebels are in Idlib, where Al-Qaeda has managed a complete takeover of the Syrian Opposition. With an Al-Qaeda takeover certain in Idlib, the Trump Administration has given Russia permission to destroy them unhindered.

But after Idlib, it would be foolish to expect that violence will correspondingly decrease across the Middle-East. In 2013, Mohammed Morsi was overthrown, and while stability returned to Egypt for a time, instability increased in Syria, Iraq and Libya in 2014. With Syria set to be cleared of jihadists and Iraq set for a lull in the fighting, conflicts in Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan will all intensify.

But Libya is the last bastion of the US-intervened Arab Spring. Jihadists, though failing in Syria, might instead return to Libya to make sure Islamism rules somewhere in the Arab world.

What happens in Idlib may determine what happens in Libya. Should Turkey close its borders to Idlib in the ensuing conflict between Al-Qaeda and the Syrian government, then Libya would have less to fear. However, should Turkey allow jihadists to flee Syria only to regroup in Libya, then the people of Libya will suffer enormously, and a new terror organisation could rear its ugly head in Libya.

Turkey could send Syrian Al-Qaeda militants to Libya to shore up the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan forces there. Having lost Ikhwan dominance in Syria and Egypt, Libya is one of the last bastions of instability through which Ikhwan could take over, benefiting Turkish influence in the Arab world.

Added to the conundrum is the current crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia supports the Tobruk government in the east, while Turkey and Qatar both support the Government of National Accord in Libya and the largely Ikhwan militants which back it. For Qatar, Libya might be a way to get back at Saudi Arabia for alienating it from the GCC.

Like Iraq in 2014, escalated violence in Libya may come as a complete shock to the western world. But it will likely be another example of fallout from President Obama's Arab Spring policies, which have failed spectacularly and caused more damage to the Arab world than even the Iraq War.