Yemen: Southern Movement used to reduce Al-Qaeda Threat

With backing from the UAE, the Southern Movement has been catapulted into Yemen politics' center stage.

While Saudi Arabia has been involved in an air campaign against the Houthis, to restore Saudi ally Hadi to power over all of Yemen, in the south of the country UAE has been politically allying with the Southern Movement. This is because Saudi Arabia's ally Hadi is as unpopular in the south as in the north, and for the UAE to make sure that neither Al-Qaeda nor the Houthis end up in control of Southern Yemen, bolstering efforts for the south to secede from the north is advantageous.

Before their unification in 1990, Yemen was two independent states: the more populous, mountainous north and the sparsely populated south. Due to the current Yemen war, aspirations for south secession have grown and, with UAE-backing, seem likely.

This would undoubtedly have consequences for the region. This would all at once increase governance in Southern Yemen and reduce Al-Qaeda's presence there. Under northern leadership, needs in the south have been largely ignored, meaning Al-Qaeda has long maintained its base in Southern Yemen through soft power tactics such as fixing basic services and building infrastructure. With priorities in Southern Yemen likely to be met by new leadership, Al-Qaeda will be forced to move elsewhere.

Dangerously, the only area left for Al-Qaeda to go is in Northern Yemen, against the Houthis. Should Saudi Arabia decide to continue the war against the Houthis, Al-Qaeda will end up the main foot soldiers against them, meaning that, even should Hadi regain control of Sana'a, most of his foot soldiers would be members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

There is a chance that a ceasefire will be implemented in Yemen, with the Houthis controlling the north and the Southerners controlling the south. But the Houthis are allied with Ali Abdullah Saleh, who in 1990 was the President who instigated the unification of Yemen. The Houthis, Al-Qaeda and the Southern Movement all stand to gain from continuing the conflict in the north, so Saudi Arabia may have no choice but to continue.

Should the south secede from the north, the new southern state may be encouraged to support Hadi in regaining control of Sana'a and establishing new borders between the two states. The south would be likely to support continued military efforts against the north, because as long as the north is weak, the south has the best chance of remaining a separate state.

However, Al-Qaeda stands to gain enormously. Should the south be complicit in sending their homegrown Al-Qaeda militants to fight the Houthis, this will only be advantageous in the short run. The northerners indoctrinated by Al-Qaeda, after the ousting of the Houthis and Hadi, will want revenge against the south. Southern separation from Yemen is a band aid on a fatal wound in the Arabian Peninsula.

After Egypt, Syria, will Ikhwan push for Libya?

The Ikhwan are the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, it has pushed for control of several countries: in 2012, the Ikhwan gained control of Egypt; in addition, throughout the Syrian Civil War, the Ikhwan monopolized on the violence to spread its message.

However both Egypt and Syria have ended in significant failure for the Ikhwan. In 2013 in Egypt, the Ikhwan Morsi government was overthrown. Since 2015, the rebels have been losing the Syrian civil war, and Turkey and Qatar, the two main backers of the Ikhwan worldview, have been brought to the negotiating table with Iran and Russia.

Since then, Saudi Arabia has targeted Qatar for support to Iran, the Ikhwan and Salafi groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. This has alienated Qatar from the GCC and has forced Iran and Turkey to intervene on the small Gulf nation's behalf.

While it is possible that the Ikhwan and Iranian political worlds will converge on Saudi Arabia, a more immediate proxy war is being waged in Libya: between the strongman government in the east of the country - backed by Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. - and the mainly Ikhwan government in the west - backed by Qatar, Turkey and the European Union.

A Libyan living in Switzerland, Basit Igtet, is organizing protests against both governments in Libya for the 25th of September 2017. Basit Igtet was an active member of the Libyan revolution in 2011 against Qaddafi. However, unlike other protests, Ikhwan influence has drastically decreased in both Syria and Egypt, meaning that wealthy Ikhwan support is more likely to be funded in Libya which, with the rise of Haftar Al-Khalifa, could very easily escalate into a new level of violence.

Since the Arab Spring, one of the problems with a decrease in violence and instability in one country is a corresponding increase in another. It may just be that, in the next few months, it will be Libya's turn to churn instability and chaos previously unimaginable under the former regime of Moammar Al-Qaddafi. Out of such instability and chaos, yet another terrorist organization may be formed.

After Syria, terrorism increase in Libya likely

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438605/hillary-clinton-benghazi-scandal-arming-syrian-rebels

According to Wikileaks, when Libyan President Moammar Al-Qaddafi was overthrown, his weapons were looted and taken to Syria. The insurgency in Libya died down, and most jihadists went to fight Bashar Al-Assad in Syria.

The results of such decisions by the US State Department are shocking. Syrian rebels overwhelmingly pledged allegiance to ISIS, invaded western and northern Iraq and declared a Caliphate.

Now, after 3 years of US intervention and after 2 years of Russian intervention in Syria, ISIS is almost defeated in Iraq and almost destroyed in Syria. ISIS will still remain a potent threat to Iraq, but in Syria, so long as Bashar Al-Assad remains in power, ISIS is highly unlikely to return.

Now the tables are turned. The only area of dominance for anti-Assad rebels are in Idlib, where Al-Qaeda has managed a complete takeover of the Syrian Opposition. With an Al-Qaeda takeover certain in Idlib, the Trump Administration has given Russia permission to destroy them unhindered.

But after Idlib, it would be foolish to expect that violence will correspondingly decrease across the Middle-East. In 2013, Mohammed Morsi was overthrown, and while stability returned to Egypt for a time, instability increased in Syria, Iraq and Libya in 2014. With Syria set to be cleared of jihadists and Iraq set for a lull in the fighting, conflicts in Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan will all intensify.

But Libya is the last bastion of the US-intervened Arab Spring. Jihadists, though failing in Syria, might instead return to Libya to make sure Islamism rules somewhere in the Arab world.

What happens in Idlib may determine what happens in Libya. Should Turkey close its borders to Idlib in the ensuing conflict between Al-Qaeda and the Syrian government, then Libya would have less to fear. However, should Turkey allow jihadists to flee Syria only to regroup in Libya, then the people of Libya will suffer enormously, and a new terror organisation could rear its ugly head in Libya.

Turkey could send Syrian Al-Qaeda militants to Libya to shore up the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan forces there. Having lost Ikhwan dominance in Syria and Egypt, Libya is one of the last bastions of instability through which Ikhwan could take over, benefiting Turkish influence in the Arab world.

Added to the conundrum is the current crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia supports the Tobruk government in the east, while Turkey and Qatar both support the Government of National Accord in Libya and the largely Ikhwan militants which back it. For Qatar, Libya might be a way to get back at Saudi Arabia for alienating it from the GCC.

Like Iraq in 2014, escalated violence in Libya may come as a complete shock to the western world. But it will likely be another example of fallout from President Obama's Arab Spring policies, which have failed spectacularly and caused more damage to the Arab world than even the Iraq War.

US leaflets undermine Afghan War

Though well known for patriotism, the US continue to have an abysmal handling of foreign policy in the Middle-East.

Days ago, leaflets were dispatched in Parwan Province, north of Kabul, in which a lion was devouring a dog. Unfortunately, the Taliban's logo, "There is no god but God and Mohammed is God's Messenger" was embedded on the dog, while the US was portrayed as the lion.

The reason this causes such a problem is that this slogan of the Taliban is also the shahaada, the proclamation a person says to become a Muslim. It is in Arabic, considered by Afghans the language of God. But a dog is considered spiritually unclean and defiled. Combining a dog with the perceived words of God is definitely ill advised.

Far more beneficial would have been to design a pamphlet with Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundaza riding a dog into battle, while the US and Afghans riding lions to defeat him. The Afghans would have laughed and got the message.

Either these leaflets were distributed by accident, or it was an act of sabotage from within the military and/or Trump Administration. President Trump wants to win the Afghan war, but not everyone within the Administration and military would benefit from a victory in Afghanistan. Some US politicians are bought out by China, a benefactor from a US defeat in Afghanistan, so their priorities lie elsewhere.

This is a blow to decisive victory in Afghanistan. Whether President Trump is able to deal with this foreign policy blunder effectively will determine the outcome of the war during his Presidency.

Haftar Al-Khalifa and Israel

Haftar Al-Khalifa, the strong man winning the Libyan civil war, is cultivating stronger ties with Israel, according to the following article:

http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/haftar-israeli-military-aid-strongman-reveals-new-friend-libya-1638239413

This represents a pattern which continues to occur post-Arab Spring: Sunni Arab countries are looking to Israel for their national security. With the increase of Iranian dominance, this increase is noticeable between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and with the fall of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, Sisi has also cultivated strong ties with Israel.

It also exposes the false narrative of an implicit alliance between Israel and Salafi/Ikwani terrorism. While this is certainly conclusive in Syria, this does not hold true in every Arab conflict. In the cases of Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE, terrorists hinder Israeli influence, not help. Israel prefers strongmen wary of terrorism and Iran, but would rather Salafi or Ikhwani terrorists to Iranian allied states.

As for Libya, this is good news: Haftar sending signals to Israel means the US will be less inclined to condemn Khalifa and Russia for stabilizing the country and create less hostility.

Afghanistan Strategy to wait until after ISIS?

It might be that the reason the Trump Administration is taking so long on a strategy for winning the Afghan war is because they wish to see ISIS defeated first.

Bush and Obama both began their presidencies more interested in Afghanistan, yet ended up more invested in Iraq; for Bush it was invading Iraq 18 months after Afghanistan and for Obama, it was returning to Iraq to defeat ISIS in 2014. Trump may just be doing the opposite: beginning his presidency more interested in Iraq and ending up more invested in Afghanistan.

Certainly the long Afghan policy review is welcome news for many, as it is always better to have a plan thoroughly reviewed and scrutinized before being implemented. But it might also be because the President's priorities are elsewhere in foreign policy: first with ISIS but also with North Korea.

The end of the war on ISIS is in sight. Raqqa is surrounded by the Syrian Kurds. The Syrian Arab Army is decimating ISIS across the desert of eastern Syria. Mosul has been retaken by the Iraqi Army. Tel Afar, Hawija and western Anbar are ISIS' last strongholds in Iraq. Abadi and Trump have agreed to keeping a residual US force in Iraq after the defeat of ISIS. Trump has stated the US is not going into Syria to remove Bashar Al-Assad.

Though Trump has said that after ISIS is defeated, he would spend more time invested in rebuilding America, in Afghanistan glints a desire to outshine Obama: Obama withdrew from Iraq in 2011, to return 3 years later to a country decimated by ISIS. Can Trump win a Bush-era war where Obama could not? He campaigned hard against the Obama doctrine, and is making all the right moves to push the US to victory in Afghanistan.

But it may just be that we will not see a coherent policy on Afghanistan until ISIS is defeated.

Why Trump will not leave Afghanistan

There has been talk in the White House about leaving Afghanistan altogether. But Trump will not leave Afghanistan.

This ploy by Trump - suggesting to leave Afghanistan - is to get his cabinet to think seriously about how to win the war there. Threatening to pull out puts their toes to the fire and forces them to come up with a different solution.

Some progress has been made in Afghan War policy. Trump has escalated strikes on the Taliban and the Islamic State of Afghanistan; policy reviews have included criticism of Pakistan's double game, making sure Afghanistan does not become another client state of Iran or Russia and, crucially, given the United States an economic reason to stay in Afghanistan: minerals, which the Taliban make part of their living off.

What should be undeniable - but currently is not - is that the Taliban can be beaten so long as their economic supply is strangled and border control between Afghanistan and Pakistan is strengthened. Most of the money the Taliban makes is from narcotics, secondly from minerals - if both of these fell into the hands of the government, this would make the difference needed to push tribes away from supporting the Taliban and back to the government.

In fact, narcotics in the hands of the Afghan and US forces could go some way to destabilizing Iran if they were sold to Iranians on the black market.

Trump will not leave Afghanistan because to leave would be to do exactly what Obama did with Iraq in 2011, something Trump campaigned against. Winning a Bush-era war where Obama could not would be icing on the cake for Trump's Presidency.

In any case, the US staying in Afghanistan is good for the Middle-East. It keeps the US military industrial complex churning, allows Russia more influence in countries like Syria, Libya and, in the future, Yemen, and deprives Iran, Al-Qaeda and ISIS a safe haven in another country.

But, as Trump well knows, the Afghan war must be won, or else Afghanistan will become the US' next Vietnam. And Trump will do everything he can to make sure that doesn't happen, for veterans and for America First.